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USING DATA TO REDUCE POLICE 
VIOLENCE 
STEPHEN RUSHIN* 
Abstract: Congress passed the Death in Custody Reporting Act in 2014, which 
created a national database on civilian deaths caused by law enforcement. The Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigations and the Bureau of Justice Statistics have subsequently 
also announced new efforts to collect data on the frequency of deadly encounters 
between law enforcement and civilians. This Article explores how the federal gov-
ernment could use these newly amassed datasets to reduce police violence. This 
Article makes two contributions. The first Part of the Article argues that data alone 
will be insufficient to bring about widespread reform in local police departments. 
By making these datasets publicly available, the federal government could incentiv-
ize some police departments to prioritize reductions in police violence. But even 
when faced with troubling statistical trends, there is no guarantee that some of the 
nation’s most problematic law enforcement agencies will voluntarily make expen-
sive policy and procedural reforms. Thus, the second Part of the Article considers 
some ways that the U.S. Attorney General could harness these new datasets to im-
prove the use of federal civil rights litigation against local police departments. Un-
der 42 U.S.C. § 14141, the Attorney General has the power to seek equitable relief 
against police departments engaged in a pattern or practice of unconstitutional mis-
conduct, including excessive uses of force. By using this data, the Attorney General 
can incrementally improve the enforcement of § 14141 in a way that incentives 
local police departments to implement reforms aimed at reducing officer violence.  
INTRODUCTION 
Several recent, high profile police killings of civilians have ignited a na-
tional debate about the regulation of law enforcement.1 Many advocates have 
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 1 Most notably, the killings of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri, Eric Garner of New York, 
New York, and Tamir Rice of Cleveland, Ohio have sparked national outrage. See, e.g., Julie Bosman 
& Emma G. Fitzsimmons, Grief and Protests Follow Shooting of a Teenager, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/11/us/police-say-mike-brown-was-killed-after-struggle-for-
gun.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/7UUN-GSL8] (providing an early account of Michael Brown’s death 
at the hands of the Ferguson Police Department); J. David Goodman & Al Baker, Wave of Protests 
After Grand Jury Doesn’t Indict Officer in Eric Garner Chokehold Case, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/04/nyregion/grand-jury-said-to-bring-no-charges-in-staten-island-
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argued that in order to reduce civilian deaths at the hands of law enforcement, 
the United States must better document police behavior through national statis-
tics.2 Although the federal government keeps records on everything from “how 
many people were victims of unprovoked shark attacks . . . to the number of 
hogs and pigs living on farms in the [United States], there is no reliable data on 
how many people are shot by police officers each year.”3 In response, Con-
gress passed the Death in Custody Reporting Act (“DCRA”), which requires 
police departments to document the death of any person “who is detained, un-
der arrest, or is in the process of being arrested.”4 Under the law, police de-
                                                                                                                           
chokehold-death-of-eric-garner.html [http://perma.cc/QT7M-5MMU] (providing a detailed account of 
Eric Garner’s death after being choked by police); Richard A. Oppel Jr., Police Gave Boy No Aid 
After Shooting in Cleveland, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 8, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/09/us/
police-in-cleveland-boys-fatal-shooting-did-not-give-medical-aid.html [http://perma.cc/J2GQ-EQZM] 
(explaining how Cleveland officers shot and failed to offer any medical assistance to a twelve-year-
old named Tamir Rice, who was shot while holding a toy gun, after a 911 call reported “a guy” hold-
ing a “probably fake” pistol). 
 2 Blake Fleetwood, Congress Finally Acts to Prevent Police Killings, but Will It Make a Differ-
ence?, WASH. MONTHLY (Dec. 17, 2014), http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/ten-miles-square/
2014/12/congress_finally_acts_to_preve053348.php# [http://perma.cc/U5WZ-L7SW] (describing 
how Rand Paul was a prominent supporter of the Death in Custody Reporting Act, which calls on 
local law enforcement agencies to report all people killed during arrests or while in their custody); Jon 
Swaine, Eric Holder Calls Failure to Collect Reliable Data on Police Killings Unacceptable, THE 
GUARDIAN (Jan. 15, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/jan/15/eric-holder-no-reliable-
fbi-data-police-related-killings [http://perma.cc/3YUB-CFFP] (stating “[t]he troubling reality is that 
we lack the ability right now to comprehensively track the number of incidents of either uses of force 
directed at police officers or uses of force by police,” and saying “[t]his strikes many—including 
me—as unacceptable”). 
 3 Wesley Lowery, How Many Police Shootings a Year? No One Knows, WASH. POST (Sept. 8, 
2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2014/09/08/how-many-police-shootings-a-
year-no-one-knows [http://perma.cc/3GCA-GV7M]; see also Rob Barry & Coulter Jones, Hundreds 
of Police Killings Are Uncounted in Federal Statistics, WALL STREET J. (Dec. 3, 2014), http://www.
wsj.com/articles/hundreds-of-police-killings-are-uncounted-in-federal-statistics-1417577504 [http://
perma.cc/8GQD-7GAK]; Eugene Robinson, What America’s Police Departments Don’t Want You to 
Know, WASH. POST (Dec. 1, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/eugene-robinson-its-a-
crime-that-we-dont-know-how-many-people-police-shoot-to-death/2014/12/01/adedcb00-7998-11e4-
b821-503cc7efed9e_story.html [http://perma.cc/FH36-9AN3] (stating “no one can say for sure” how 
many people police officers kill every year). This sentiment was perhaps best summed up by FBI 
Director James B. Comey, who remarked that, “It’s ridiculous that I can’t tell you how many people 
were shot by the police last week, last month, last year.” Michael S. Schmidt, F.B.I. Director Speaks 
Out on Race and Police Bias, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 12, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/13/us/
politics/fbi-director-comey-speaks-frankly-about-police-view-of-blacks.html [http://perma.cc/2LND-
VN9J]. 
 4 Death in Custody Reporting Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-242, 128 Stat. 2860 (2014) (to be 
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 13727). Technically, this law is simply a reauthorization of an earlier measure 
passed in 2000. It took several years for law enforcement agencies to report data via the original ver-
sion of this law. And the original version expired shortly thereafter, in 2006. As a result, the Depart-
ment of Justice (“DOJ”) did not release any comprehensive statistics from the first attempt at this sort 
of database. Allie Gross, Congress Is Finally Going to Make Local Law Enforcement Report How 
Many People They Kill, MOTHER JONES (Dec. 17, 2014), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/
12/death-custody-reporting-act-police-shootings-ferguson-garner [http://perma.cc/NY9F-XD5B]. 
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partments must report the manner and circumstances of these deaths.5 States 
that fail to report these statistics to the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) “could 
be stripped of up to 10 percent of the federal money they receive for local law 
enforcement purposes.”6 The DCRA also requires the U.S. Attorney General to 
study the resulting data and make recommendations to Congress on how the 
federal government can reduce the number of deaths in custody.7  
In addition, the Federal Bureau of Investigations (“FBI”) has announced 
that it will “sharply expand” its system of tracking fatal police shootings.8 As 
part of this push, the FBI will attempt to track not just civilian deaths, but “any 
incident in which an officer causes serious injury or death to civilians, includ-
ing through the use of stun guns, pepper spray and even fists and feet.”9 The 
new FBI data may be available as early as 2017.10  
Whereas the FBI database relies on police departments to self-report in-
formation on police behavior, the Bureau of Justice Statistics (“BJS”) has re-
cently unveiled a pilot program that relies on open-source data to document the 
frequency of police use of deadly force.11 The BJS is currently dedicating two 
                                                                                                                           
 5 Eli Hager, The Ferguson Bill, MARSHALL PROJECT (Dec. 12, 2014), https://www.themarshall
project.org/2014/12/12/the-ferguson-bill [https://perma.cc/22R9-FR7Q] (“Each report must include 
‘the name, gender, race, ethnicity, and age of the deceased; the date, time, and location of the death; 
the law enforcement agency’ involved and a description of how the death occurred.”). 
 6 Id. (elaborating that the funds local law enforcement would lose would be through “so-called 
Byrne grants, which account for about $500 million a year”). For more information on how Byrne 
grants are awarded and distributed, see How Byrne JAG Grants Are Awarded and Distributed, NAT’L 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE ASS’N, http://www.ncja.org/how-byrne-jag-grants-are-awarded-and-distributed 
[http://perma.cc/ZP54-CPPJ] (explaining how these grants are “awarded to states and territories by a 
formula based on population and Part 1 violent crimes”). 
 7 42 U.S.C.A. § 13727(f) (West 2014) (stating “[t]he Attorney General shall carry out a study of 
the information reported under subsection (b) and section 3(a) to . . . determine means by which such 
information can be used to reduce the number of such deaths”). 
 8 Kimberly Kindy, FBI to Sharply Expand System for Tracking Fatal Police Shootings, WASH. POST 
(Dec. 8, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/fbi-to-sharply-expand-system-for-tracking-
fatal-police-shootings/2015/12/08/a60fbc16-9dd4-11e5-bce4-708fe33e3288_story.html [https://perma.
cc/72V3-RZNY]. 
 9 Id. 
 10 Id. (explaining that “[t]he FBI’s system for tracking fatal police shootings is a ‘travesty,’ and 
the agency will replace it by 2017”). 
 11 Tom McCarthy, US Government Database Hopes to Tell ‘Whole Story’ of Police Killings After 
Year of Guardian Count, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 13, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/
2015/dec/13/justice-department-database-police-killings-counted-statistics [https://perma.cc/UGC7-
NDA3]. Several media outlets have already explored this sort of an open-source approach to docu-
menting police killings. See, e.g., How to Help, FATAL ENCOUNTERS, http://www.fatalencounters.org/
how-to-help/ [http://perma.cc/UJ2N-QZ37] (describing the methodology for documenting police kill-
ings and offering the public a submission form option to submit information about police killings); 
The Counted: People Killed by Police in the US, THE GUARDIAN, http://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/ng-interactive/2015/jun/01/the-counted-police-killings-us-database [http://perma.cc/8ZDM-
L52U] (documenting the number of individuals killed by police in the United States and including a 
tab at the top requesting the public to “send a tip” about a police killing that may not be reflected in 
the database). 
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computer servers to “combing the internet 24 hours a day for reports of any-
thing that looks like someone dying in an interaction with a police officer.”12 
As part of this BJS initiative, analysts have begun contacting “police, medical 
examiners and other local officials to check the accuracy of the information 
and gather additional facts.”13 The BJS hopes to “convert [this] pilot into a 
full-fledged program” that will produce annual data “by the end of 2016.”14 
Admittedly, each of these planned databases may have problems. The fi-
nancial penalty for failing to report DCRA data is relatively small.15 The FBI 
database will rely on police departments to self-report data voluntarily.16 And 
the BJS database may only identify police killings that result in a news story.17 
Despite their individual shortcomings, these three databases combined provide 
the best available information on the frequency of civilian deaths at the hands 
of law enforcement. Thus, in the coming years policymakers must wrestle with 
a challenging question: Once we have more thorough data on killings by law 
enforcement, how can we use this information to reduce police violence?18 
In addressing this question, this Article makes two contributions. The first 
Part of the Article argues that data alone will be insufficient to bring about 
widespread reductions in police use of deadly force. It is possible that by mak-
ing these datasets publicly available, the federal government could incentivize 
some local police departments to prioritize reductions in officer use of deadly 
force. Currently, the public has access to very few national statistics on local 
police behavior.19 By making more data on police killings publicly available, 
the federal government could empower the public, the press, and interest 
groups to identify potentially problematic patterns of police violence. This 
                                                                                                                           
 12 McCarthy, supra note 11. 
 13 Kindy, supra note 8. 
 14 Id. 
 15 Editorial, Data on Officer-Involved Shootings Will Finally Get Compiled Under State and 
Federal Laws, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 3, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-police-
shooting-data-20160103-story.html [https://perma.cc/55ZD-2HCA] (“The latest version of the law is 
superior to its predecessor in that it has teeth, albeit not terribly sharp ones.”). 
 16 Kindy, supra note 8 (“The new database will continue to rely on the voluntary reports of local 
police departments; FBI officials said they lack the legal authority to mandate reporting.”). It is worth 
noting, though, that the FBI has expressed an intention to offer federal grants to local police depart-
ments that need additional resources to comply with this data request. And the FBI has received sup-
port from “the nation’s largest police organizations,” which “have agreed for the first time to lobby 
local departments to produce the data.” Id. 
 17 See McCarthy, supra note 11 (explaining that the dataset will be based on information availa-
ble online). 
 18 This question is timely and particularly important because the text of the DCRA requires the 
Attorney General to study the DCRA data and make recommendations to Congress on how the federal 
government can reduce the number of deaths in custody. 42 U.S.C.A. § 13727(f) (stating “[t]he Attor-
ney General shall carry out a study of the information reported under subsection (b) and section 3(a) 
to . . . determine means by which such information can be used to reduce the number of such deaths”). 
 19 See infra note 43 and accompanying text (discussing some of the data that are currently public-
ly available). 
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could, in turn, motivate some local police departments to institute proactive 
reforms aimed at reducing the frequency of police violence. But this Article 
argues that even when faced with troubling statistical trends, there is no guar-
antee that many of the nation’s most problematic police departments will vol-
untarily make expensive policy and procedural reforms. In making this argu-
ment, this Article provides a detailed account of the structural, political, and 
organizational barriers to bottom-up police reform. This Part concludes that in 
order to bring about meaningful reform in local law enforcement agencies, the 
federal government will have to do more than merely provide public access to 
data on police killings. 
The second Part of the Article considers some possible ways that the At-
torney General could use these new datasets to bring about reform in local po-
lice practices. Specifically, this Article demonstrates how the Attorney General 
could use this newly amassed data on police violence to facilitate federal civil 
rights litigation against local police departments. Under 42 U.S.C. § 14141, the 
Attorney General has the power to seek equitable relief against police depart-
ments engaged in a pattern or practice of unconstitutional misconduct, includ-
ing excessive use of force.20 Essentially, § 14141 gives the DOJ the power to 
force local police departments to make costly reforms aimed at curbing future 
wrongdoing—provided the DOJ can prove the police department is engaged in 
                                                                                                                           
 20 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 210401(a), 
108 Stat. 1796, 2071 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (2012)) (“It shall be unlawful for any governmen-
tal authority . . . to engage in a pattern or practice of conduct by law enforcement officers . . . that 
deprives persons of rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution . . . .”); 
42 U.S.C. § 14141(b) (“Whenever the Attorney General has reasonable cause to believe [that there is 
a pattern or practice of misconduct] . . . the Attorney General . . . may in a civil action obtain appro-
priate equitable and declaratory relief to eliminate the pattern or practice.”); see also Stephen Rushin, 
Federal Enforcement of Police Reform, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3189, 3207–15 (2014) [hereinafter 
Rushin, Federal Enforcement of Police Reform] (explaining the rise of § 14141). Congress passed 
§ 14141 in response to the Rodney King incident in Los Angeles. See David M. Jaros, Preempting the 
Police, 55 B.C. L. REV. 1149, 1159–60 (2014) (describing legislative action following the Rodney 
King beating). The Rodney King incident happened in March of 1991 when two police cars pursued a 
possible drunk driver speeding on a highway in Los Angeles. Seth Mydans, Seven Minutes in Los 
Angeles—A Special Report; Videotaped Beating by Officers Puts Full Glare on Brutality Issue, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 18, 1991), http://www.nytimes.com/1991/03/18/us/seven-minutes-los-angeles-special-
report-videotaped-beating-officers-puts-full.html [http://perma.cc/8ZDM-L52U]. Minutes later, “a 
video taken by a nearby onlooker showed four Los Angeles Police Department . . . officers brutally 
beating one of the car’s occupants, a man named Rodney King, without any apparent provocation.” 
Stephen Rushin, Structural Reform Litigation in American Police Departments, 99 MINN. L. REV. 
1343, 1344–85 (2015) [hereinafter Rushin, Structural Reform Litigation]. Investigations revealed that 
the Rodney King beating was not the result of a few bad officers. For more information about the 
congressional investigation into the Rodney King incident, see generally Police Brutality: Hearing 
Before the H. Subcomm. on Civil & Constitutional Rights of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d 
Cong. 133 (1991). Instead, it was indicative of a “diseased organizational culture within the LAPD 
that condoned violence, tolerated racism, and failed to respond to wrongdoing.” Rushin, Structural 
Reform Litigation, supra, at 1345. Federal law at the time was simply incapable of dealing with this 
sort of “systemic wrongdoing.” Id. So in 1994, Congress passed § 14141. 
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systemic misconduct. Soon after Congress passed § 14141, many scholars 
praised it as one of the most important regulations of police misconduct in 
American history.21 But this optimism soon turned into disappointment as crit-
ics observed that the DOJ lacked the necessary tools to enforce § 14141.22  
Previous empirical work has attributed this lack of aggressive enforcement of 
§ 14141 to a combination of resource scarcity and the lack of national statistics 
on police behavior.23 Thus, the DOJ could use data on police violence to im-
prove the enforcement of § 14141 in three ways. 
First, the DOJ could use these datasets as tools to identify police depart-
ments engaged in a pattern or practice of misconduct.24 Previous empirical re-
search has shown that, in the absence of national statistics on police behavior, 
the DOJ has been forced to use a range of highly imperfect methods to identify 
police agencies in violation of § 14141.25 Admittedly, these new datasets will 
                                                                                                                           
 21 Around the time of the law’s passage, one scholar theorized that § 14141 might end up being 
“more significant, in the long run, than Mapp v. Ohio . . . which mandated the exclusion of evidence 
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment.” William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of 
Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 539 n.134 (2001). Others at the time suggested that § 14141 
would become the “most promising legal mechanism” for combatting police misconduct. Barbara E. 
Armacost, Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 453, 457 (2003). 
 22 See Rushin, Federal Enforcement of Police Reform, supra note 20, at 3219–23 (describing the 
challenges the DOJ faces in case selection). It is also worth noting here that many critics have ob-
served that the DOJ appears to under-enforce § 14141. See, e.g., Brandon Garrett, Remedying Racial 
Profiling, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 41, 100–01 (2001) (noting “the DOJ lacks the resources” to 
address problems like racial profiling as demonstrated by the “[f]ew consent decrees” used thus far); 
Myriam E. Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform Litigation: Deputizing Private Citizens in the En-
forcement of Civil Rights, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1384, 1407–11 (2000) (linking the lack of DOJ en-
forcement to resource and political constraints); John C. Jeffries, Jr. & George A. Rutherglen, Struc-
tural Reform Revisited, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1387, 1419 (2007) (“[T]he Department of Justice faces 
financial and political constraints on its effectiveness [in enforcing § 14141].”); Kami Chavis Sim-
mons, The Politics of Policing: Ensuring Stakeholder Collaboration in the Federal Reform of Local 
Law Enforcement Agencies, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 489, 493 (2008) (“Citing the expediency 
and cost-effectiveness of their settlement strategy, U.S. government officials have expressly articulat-
ed a preference for avoiding litigation and negotiating with municipalities to ensure compliance with 
the suggested reforms.”). As a result, critics have complained that the DOJ lacks a strategy for select-
ing police departments for § 14141 litigation. Eric Lichtblau, U.S. Low Profile in Big-City Police 
Probes Is Under Fire, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2000), http://articles.latimes.com/2000/mar/17/news/mn-
9869 [http://perma.cc/Y4VN-CC8E]. The process by which the DOJ selects cases for § 14141 litiga-
tion currently appears “messy, imprecise, and generally hidden from outsiders.” Rushin, Federal En-
forcement of Police Reform, supra note 20, at 3194. Today, the DOJ uses a collection of highly imper-
fect methods to identify which local police agencies are in need of federally mandated reform. The 
DOJ relies on media coverage, existing civil litigation, internal whistleblowers, and academic studies 
to identify problematic police departments. Rushin, Federal Enforcement of Police Reform, supra 
note 20, at 3220–24. 
 23 See infra notes 217–248 and accompanying text (describing the challenges of § 14141 en-
forcement including lack of resources, spillover, and case selection troubles). 
 24 Infra notes 253–261 and accompanying text. 
 25 Until recently, little was known about how the DOJ identified agencies in violation of § 14141. 
This author’s recent empirical study based on interviews with DOJ personnel and other stakeholders 
suggests that the DOJ uses a range of proxies in the absence of hard statistics on police misconduct. 
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not be perfect.26 But they will be useful in judging the comparative presence of 
police violence across different police departments. Although a police depart-
ment may be able to manipulate some data, it seems unlikely that departments 
will be able to hide patterns of police killings from all three.27 And although 
the DOJ has already sought this sort of information on police killings through 
previous § 14141 investigations, the DOJ has often only been able to acquire 
this information after initiating an investigation of a police department.28 By 
making this information publicly available for all police departments across 
the country, these datasets will give the DOJ important tools to make cross-
departmental comparisons that may reveal patterns of police behavior it would 
have otherwise missed. 
Second, the DOJ could publicize DCRA, FBI and BJS data on police vio-
lence in a manner that stimulates some proactive reform in local police de-
partments. Because of its resource limitations, the DOJ has only been able to 
investigate around three law enforcement agencies each year under § 14141—
or less than 0.02% of the nation’s police departments.29 Section 14141 action 
                                                                                                                           
The DOJ relies on media coverage. Rushin, Federal Enforcement of Police Reform, supra note 20, at 
3220–21 (citing Los Angles, Cincinnati, and Washington, D.C. as communities where media coverage 
of police misconduct inspired DOJ action via § 14141). The DOJ also has turned to existing civil 
litigation. Id. at 3219–20 (explaining how the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) and National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (“NAACP”) were instrumental in investigating 
police misconduct or bringing their own civil suits against some police departments before DOJ inter-
vention). Whistleblowers have also helped the DOJ in identifying problematic agencies. Id. at 3223–
24 (detailing how officers “would contact the division and talk about problems they had witnessed or 
problems they, themselves, had experienced when they were not in uniform”). And even academic 
studies have been useful. Id. at 3222–23 (citing a study by John Lamberth). 
 26 See supra notes 15–17 and accompanying text (describing some of the likely limitations of the 
DCRA, FBI, and BJS datasets). 
 27 To be clear, a police department is not necessarily engaged in a pattern of unconstitutional 
misconduct just because its officers are involved in more civilian deaths than other agencies. Police 
sometimes need to use deadly force to defend themselves and others. Additionally, some municipali-
ties are simply more dangerous than others and may require police to use deadly force more often. 
Nonetheless, an unusually large number of civilian deaths at the hands of a particular law enforcement 
agency raise questions about the adequacy of that agency’s training and oversight mechanisms, as 
excessive use of force is the most common allegation made by the DOJ in § 14141 cases. The DOJ 
has relied on a pattern of excessive use of force as a legal basis for federal intervention in 71% of prior 
§ 14141 cases. See Sarah Childress, Fixing the Force, PBS FRONTLINE, http://apps.frontline.org/fixing
theforce [https://perma.cc/MC75-VQA8] (showing that forty-eight of sixty-eight allegations as of 
January 2015 involved claims of excessive use of force). 
 28 Albuquerque, New Mexico provides an example of a case where the DOJ sought this infor-
mation. There, the DOJ received information on the circumstances surrounding police shootings re-
sulting in deaths as part of its investigation of the Albuquerque Police Department (“APD”). This 
evaluation revealed a troubling pattern of apparently unjustified killings by the APD dating back sev-
eral years. CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE ALBUQUERQUE PO-
LICE DEPARTMENT 1 (2014), http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/apd_findings_4-10-
14.pdf [http://perma.cc/PDX7-4GY5] [hereinafter Albuquerque Investigative Finds Letter from DOJ]. 
 29 This is not meant to criticize the DOJ’s current enforcement approach. This approach makes 
sense, given the lack of hard data available to justify § 14141 intervention into one police department 
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has been so rare that a police department’s selection for federal oversight often 
seems procedurally unjust.30 These conditions raise a set of classical enforce-
ment dilemmas. How can the DOJ ensure widespread statutory compliance 
with limited § 14141 enforcement? And under these sorts of resource con-
straints, how can the DOJ ensure that enforcement is procedurally just? To ad-
dress these problems, the DOJ could use the DCRA, FBI, and BJS datasets to 
create an annual, public list of “Police Departments Responsible for the Most 
Civilian Deaths.”31 The DOJ could then issue an ultimatum to these police de-
partments—either (1) explain the unusually large number of civilian deaths per 
capita in your community, or (2) provide evidence of meaningful reforms taken 
to reduce the number of police killings. To enforce this ultimatum, the DOJ 
could prioritize § 14141 enforcement against police departments that fail to 
provide evidence of proactive reforms.32  By transparently announcing selec-
tion criteria for § 14141 based in part on DCRA, FBI, and BJS statistics, the 
DOJ can both improve the perceived fairness of § 14141 enforcement and mo-
tivate some police department to adopt measures aimed at reducing police use 
of deadly force.33  
Third, the DOJ could use this newly amassed data to monitor police de-
partments that have already undergone § 14141 reform. This would address 
another significant problem facing the DOJ’s enforcement of § 14141. Alt-
hough the DOJ has successfully used the statute to overhaul a number of police 
                                                                                                                           
over another. But because the DOJ has only had the resources to investigate around three police de-
partments in the United States each year, getting selected has felt akin to “winning a horrible lottery.” 
Rushin, Federal Enforcement of Police Reform, supra note 20, at 3194. 
 30 For an example of this feeling of procedural unfairness, see Lichtblau, supra note 22 (recalling 
comments made by Gary Durfour, former City Manager of Steubenville, Ohio, who openly ques-
tioned why the DOJ chose to investigate Steubenville, Ohio when other departments appeared to have 
more significant problems). 
 31 See infra notes 262–272 and accompanying text (discussing creation of such a list). 
 32 This recommendation is somewhat similar to one made by Professor Rachel A. Harmon. See 
generally Rachel A. Harmon, Promoting Civil Rights Through Proactive Policing Reform, 62 STAN. 
L. REV. 1 (2009) (focusing on (1) the justification for the DOJ creating a list of problematic police 
departments and (2) the need to prioritize litigation against police departments on this list). This Arti-
cle argues that the newly developed DCRA, FBI, and BJS data on police violence will provide one of 
the few statistical databases the DOJ could use in developing an enforcement strategy similar to that 
recommended by Professor Harmon. Thus, this Article hopes to both support and extend Professor 
Harmon’s creative and innovative proposal based on these new databases. 
 33 Professor Harmon has previously observed how this sort of an enforcement approach could 
incentivize proactive reform in local police departments. See Harmon, supra note 32, at 1 (describing 
how her proposal could “induce reform in many more” police departments than the current enforce-
ment regime). But no previous research has identified how this sort of an enforcement approach could 
correct another significant problem facing § 14141 interventions—the perceived lack of procedural 
justice in the case selection process. This is an ongoing problem. Rushin, Structural Reform Litiga-
tion, supra note 20, at 1370 (explaining that while the DOJ’s current “approach to case selection gives 
the DOJ wide authority, it also understandably frustrates police departments”). The enforcement pro-
posal made in this Article could help alleviate this concern. 
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departments,34 questions remain about the sustainability of these reforms.35 
The DOJ has not yet established a mechanism to keep track of police depart-
ments that have previously undergone § 14141 reforms. The creation of these 
new datasets provides a unique and cost-effective opportunity for the DOJ to 
conduct some limited monitoring of police departments after § 14141 interven-
tion ends. 
To be clear, the DCRA, FBI, and BJS datasets are not a solution to all of 
the problems with § 14141. As this Article concludes, these databases should 
be just the beginning of a broader federal effort to collect more data on local 
police conduct. Congress passed § 14141 in order to give the Attorney General 
the power to enjoin all types of systemic misconduct within police depart-
ments, not just excessive uses of deadly force. If Congress were to require lo-
cal police departments to report other valuable information on local police be-
havior—like the frequency of citizen complaints, the demographic profiles of 
individuals stopped by law enforcement, the number of civil rights suits stem-
ming from police misconduct, or the number of use of force incidents—the 
DOJ should similarly incorporate this data into its enforcement of § 14141. But 
Congress has yet to take such bold action to document local police behavior. In 
the absence of other useful data, this Article argues that consideration of the 
DCRA, FBI, and BJS datasets on police killings will provide the DOJ with an 
opportunity to at least incrementally improve the enforcement of § 14141.  
As such, this Article is divided into three Parts. Part I of this Article be-
gins by examining passage of the DCRA and the announcement of the FBI and 
BJS datasets. It shows that, while imperfect, these datasets may come to repre-
sent some of the best available information on local police behavior. Part II 
argues that the federal government ought to make data from the DCRA, FBI, 
and BJS databases publicly accessible. Part II ultimately argues that while 
transparency of data may stimulate bottom-up reform in some local police de-
partments, others are likely to remain obstinately opposed to change. This re-
flects a broader problem that has plagued police departments for much of 
American history. Throughout history, many police departments have been 
unwilling or unable to respond to systemic misconduct within their ranks for a 
variety of structural and political reasons. This was one of the primary reasons 
that the federal government has felt it necessary to gradually increase its over-
sight of local police departments in recent decades. Thus, Part II concludes that 
                                                                                                                           
 34 See Rushin, Federal Enforcement of Police Reform, supra note 20, apps. A, B (showing the 
police departments that the DOJ has reformed with § 14141 and describing the reform process in 
general terms). 
 35 There is some evidence that jurisdictions have made costly reforms under DOJ oversight, only 
to regress once the DOJ leaves town. Perhaps the best example of this would be Pittsburgh, Pennsyl-
vania, where evidence suggests that some of the hard-fought reforms have been scrapped after federal 
oversight ended. Rushin, Structural Reform Litigation, supra note 20, at 1410–11. 
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the federal government should look for ways to use DCRA, FBI, and BJS data 
on police violence to enhance the use of federal civil rights litigation against 
local police departments—namely § 14141 litigation.  Part III considers how 
the DOJ could use these new datasets to improve the application of § 14141. 
This Part first recounts the history of § 14141. It also describes the available 
empirical literature on § 14141, paying careful attention to the current chal-
lenges the DOJ faces in enforcing § 14141. Based on these observations, this 
Part concludes by showing how the DOJ could use DCRA, FBI, and BJS data 
on police violence to construct a more coherent approach to enforcing § 14141.  
I. THE EMERGING DATA ON KILLINGS BY POLICE 
The last several years have brought calls for additional data on police 
conduct.36 These calls increased significantly after the killings of Michael 
Brown,37 Eric Garner,38 and Tamir Rice.39 These calls have crossed traditional 
political party lines.40 It seems incongruent for the federal government to keep 
detailed records on the number of law enforcement officers killed or assaulted 
in the line of duty,41 but not keep comparable records on citizens killed or as-
saulted by law enforcement. Over the last two years, the federal government 
has announced several new initiatives to collect data on civilian deaths at the 
hands of law enforcement. First, in 2014, Congress finally took a significant 
step towards collecting this information with the passage of the DCRA, which 
requires police departments to report the death of any person “who is detained, 
under arrest, or is in the process of being arrested,” and requires police de-
                                                                                                                           
 36 Editorial, One Thing the U.S. Government Doesn’t Count: How Often Police Kill Civilians, 
L.A. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/ editorials/la-ed-police-statistics-
20141217-story.html [http://perma.cc/9W9R-4LTC] [hereinafter L.A. TIMES Editorial] (calling for a 
comprehensive, national database on police killings). 
 37 See, e.g., Lowery, supra note 3 (bringing up the Michael Brown shooting as one of several that 
have inspired a national conversation on police shootings). 
 38 See, e.g., Martin Kaste, System for Reporting Police Killings Unreliable, Study Finds, NPR 
(Mar. 26, 2015), http://www.npr.org/2015/03/06/391269342/system-for-reporting-police-killings-
unreliable-study-finds [http://perma.cc/M547-KQUN] (using Eric Garner as one example of a police 
killing that has inspired a national conversation about police statistics). 
 39 See, e.g., Allen G. Breed, Police Killing Data Filled with Many Unknowns, HUFFINGTON POST 
(Dec. 7, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/12/07/police-killings_n_6284358.html [http://
perma.cc/BU5T-QEXP] (describing the shooting of twelve-year-old Tamir Rice as one of many ex-
amples of police killings that have sparked calls for more detailed national statistics). 
 40 See Fleetwood, supra note 2 (describing how support for such a measure has received “rare 
bipartisan” support). 
 41 The FBI currently records detailed data on any assault or killing of a police officer in the line of 
duty as part of the Uniform Crime Reports (“UCR”). See Uniform Crime Reports, FED. BUREAU OF 
INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/ucr-publications [http://perma.cc/AZK5-LGMC] 
[hereinafter Uniform Crime Reports: Law Enforcement] (to access data regarding police officers, click 
on dates under “Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted”). 
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partments to report the manner and circumstances of the death.42 Like most 
police statistics, the DCRA requires police departments to self-report the num-
ber of individuals killed in their custody.43 The measure requires police de-
partments to report not just the occurrence of deaths in custody, but also a 
range of circumstantial and demographic information, including “the name, 
gender, race, ethnicity, and age of the deceased,” as well as “the date, time, and 
location of the death.”44  
Second, the FBI has also announced a plan to expand its recordkeeping of 
police violence.45 Like the DCRA, the FBI hopes to collect demographic in-
formation including the “age, sex, and race of the officers and subjects” as well 
as “the circumstances of the encounter and the relationship between the officer 
                                                                                                                           
 42 Death in Custody Reporting Act § 2; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1327(a). It is worth nothing, though, 
that the DCRA data contain several gaps that could limit the DCRA’s effectiveness. For example, the 
law only requires police to report deaths that occur in police custody or while police are attempting an 
arrest. Seemingly unjustified killings, like that of Tamir Rice, would very possibly fall outside the 
scope of this act. L.A. TIMES Editorial, supra note 36. 
 43 The federal government has collected information from police departments in several different 
databases. Perhaps most prominently, the FBI collects information on crimes reported in most juris-
dictions in the United States through the UCR. See Uniform Crime Reports, FED. BUREAU OF INVES-
TIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/ucr-publications [http://perma.cc/AZK5-LGMC] 
[hereinafter Uniform Crime Reports: Crime] (to access data on crime rates, click on the dates under 
“Crime in the United States”). These annual statistics report the numbers and rates of different crimes 
in each reporting jurisdiction. UCR data are self-reported voluntarily. Crime data is also aggregated in 
the National Incident Based Reporting System. See Lynn A. Addington, Studying the Crime Problem 
with NIBRS Data: Current Uses and Future Trends, in 23 HANDBOOK ON CRIME AND DEVIANCE 24–
30 (Marvin D. Krohn et al. eds., 2009). And the federal government collects information on police 
department policies, procedures, and behaviors through the Law Enforcement Management and Ad-
ministrative Statistics (“LEMAS”). E.g., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
LAW ENFORCEMENT MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATIVE STATISTICS (LEMAS): 2007 SAMPLE 
SURVEYS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES (2007), http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/
ICPSR/studies/31161 [http://perma.cc/YQ37-M65X] [hereinafter LEMAS]. This self-reporting proce-
dure has predictably led to some problems. See Barry & Jones, supra note 3 (describing apparent 
discrepancies between self-reported numbers on justifiable homicides in various jurisdictions and 
numbers obtained by the Wall Street Journal during their own independent investigation). Social 
scientists and reporters have documented numerous cases of police departments altering or manipulat-
ing data via these self-reported metrics. See, e.g., Corey Rayburn Yung, How to Lie with Rape Statis-
tics: America’s Hidden Rape Crisis, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1197, 1206 (2014) (describing how police de-
partments systemically underreport or manipulate rape statistics); Michael Matza et al., U.S. Review 
Set for Philadelphia Crime Reports, PHILA. INQUIRER (Nov. 14, 1998), http://inquirer.philly.com/
packages/crime/html/111498.asp [http://perma.cc/FJG2-MQE7] (describing investigations into a pat-
tern of underreporting of crime statistics in the Philadelphia Police Department); Steve Thompson & 
Tanya Eiserer, Experts: Dallas Undercount of Assaults Builds ‘Artificial Image,’ DALL. MORNING 
NEWS (Dec. 15, 2009), http://www.dallasnews.com/news/community-news/dallas/headlines/2009
1214-Experts-Dallas-undercount-of-assaults-6330.ece [http://perma.cc/ZD8J-EPF2] (showing how the 
Dallas Police Department has allegedly underreported assault statistics). 
 44 42 U.S.C. § 13727(b). 
 45 Tom McCarthy et al., FBI to Launch New System to Count People Killed by Police Officers, 
THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 8, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/dec/09/fbi-launch-new-
system-count-people-killed-police-officers-the-counted [https://perma.cc/SK5S-BBYW]. 
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and subject.”46 The dataset will encompass more information than the DCRA 
data, as it will include not just fatalities caused by police, but any incident in 
which an officer causes a serious injury.47 The FBI hopes to release this data 
almost immediately after the events occur, rather than waiting for the data to 
be “tallied in the aggregate at the end of each year.”48 This FBI database will 
have one major drawback: the FBI will rely on local police departments to 
self-report this information.49 This fact is troubling, because less than three 
percent of police departments have voluntarily turned over data to the FBI on 
fatal police shootings in the past.50 Without an explicit act of Congress, such as 
the DCRA, the FBI lacks the legal authority to require local police departments 
to report this data. Instead, the FBI must rely on “leaders of the nation’s largest 
police organizations . . . to lobby local police departments to produce the data,” 
as well as other financial incentives.51 
Third, the BJS has announced an ambitious plan to document police kill-
ings in a very different way. The BJS has dedicated two computer servers to 
searching the internet twenty-four hours a day for apparent incidents of civil-
ians dying in interactions with law enforcement.52 The BJS is working with a 
third-party research company to verify these incidents with law enforcement 
agencies and medical examiners’ offices.53 The BJS hopes to provide this data 
to the DOJ in 2016.54 The database should document any civilian death that 
happened “while the decedent’s ‘ability to leave’ was restricted by a law en-
forcement officer . . . but before the decedent was officially booked into jail.”55 
The BJS also plans to cross-reference its database with those created by major 
media outlets.56 The BJS database may only obtain information on police kill-
ings that receive media attention; however, this methodology should capture 
many of the deaths that occur while in the custody of police departments that 
may otherwise be unwilling to self-report to the DCRA and FBI databases. 
                                                                                                                           
 46 Id. (quoting an FBI official speaking about these plans). 
 47 Kindy, supra note 8. This should help capture many instances where officers use non-lethal 
force. 
 48 Id. (quoting Stephen L. Morris, an assistant director of the FBI’s Criminal Justice Information 
Services Division, as saying that the data should be released in “near real-time”). 
 49 See id. (“The new database will continue to rely on the voluntary reports of local police de-
partments . . . .”). 
 50 Id. (detailing the low reporting rate under a similar FBI initiative since 2011). 
 51 Id. 
 52 McCarthy, supra note 11. 
 53 These analysts contact relevant law enforcement and medical examiners and utilize a nineteen-
point questionnaire to better understand the incident. Id. 
 54 Id. (stating that “the pilot program . . . expects to deliver an initial report to the Justice Depart-
ment early next year” and that the first report should be submitted “this spring”). 
 55 Id. 
 56 See id. (noting that “[a]nalysts [will] check these lists against The Counted [The Guardian’s list 
of deaths caused by police] and other databases of people killed by police”). 
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Combined, these efforts will likely create useful data without significantly 
burdening local police departments. First, to the extent that the DCRA and FBI 
mandates require police departments to self-report data, collecting this infor-
mation should not be particularly expensive or time-consuming. And the BJS 
database puts virtually no burden on local law enforcement. Although some 
may object that because every federal reporting requirement comes at a cost to 
the local municipality, the added cost of reporting deaths caused by police in 
each jurisdiction will be minimal, given that police already provide the federal 
government with a range other, more complex statistical datasets each year.57 
Adding an additional reporting category—the number of individuals killed by 
law enforcement officers—will require little additional work.58 Further, the 
number of individuals killed in each jurisdiction by law enforcement—even in 
the worst of the worst police departments—will be a relatively low number.59 
The burden imposed by documenting the number of police killings pales in 
comparison to the burden currently placed on departments via other reporting 
measures.60 
Second, it will be somewhat difficult for a police department to hide po-
lice killings from all three databases. The literature is replete with examples of 
law enforcement agencies manipulating self-reported data.61 This manipulation 
is often easy to accomplish because it is difficult to independently verify most 
self-reported data. Take the number of robberies as an example. Particularly in 
a large city, the media is unlikely to give attention to a single robbery. And rob-
beries typically do not create any additional record outside that kept by the lo-
cal police department—unlike automobile thefts, which often produce insur-
ance claims.62 By contrast, as the last few years have vividly demonstrated, a 
police killing of a private person can make national headlines. In fact, some of 
these events receive so much press coverage that reporters and social scientists 
                                                                                                                           
 57 See L.A. TIMES Editorial, supra note 36 (“The FBI [already] compiles statistics from 18,000 
law-enforcement agencies for its annual ‘Crime in the United States’ report, but it doesn’t include ‘use 
of force’ data. Separately, the [B]ureau collects voluntarily supplied data on ‘justifiable homicide’ by 
police, defined as ‘the killing of a felon by a law enforcement officer in the line of duty.’”). 
 58 See id. (describing how many police departments “already maintain ‘use of force’ reports for 
their own analyses and personnel reviews, so these statistics are obtainable (some agencies, including 
the Los Angeles Police Department, post summaries on a website)”). 
 59 Fleetwood, supra note 2 (showing in an enclosed table that the number of police killings esti-
mated in many large cities is still fairly small). 
 60 For example, the UCR reporting requirements appear to be far more onerous than the DCRA. 
See Uniform Crime Reports: Law Enforcement, supra note 41 (providing a multitude of self-reported 
statistics); Uniform Crime Reports: Crime, supra note 43 (same). 
 61 See supra note 43 and accompanying text (describing multiple examples of police departments 
manipulating, underreporting, or otherwise altering self-reported crime statistics). 
 62 See, e.g., Franklin E. Zimring, Killings by Police Are Almost a Daily Occurrence in America, 
S.F. CHRON. (Feb. 27, 2015), http://www.sfchronicle.com/opinion/article/Killings-by-police-are-
almost-a-daily-occurrence-6105999.php [http://perma.cc/E73K-BD7E] (using insurance claims to 
verify the authenticity of the New York Police Department crime statistics for auto thefts). 
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have attempted to estimate the frequency of police killings based on media re-
ports alone.63 Third parties can also document police killings through public 
records like coroner reports and vital statistics in states and localities.64 Alt-
hough a police department may be able to hide regularized, minor misconduct 
like unjustified Terry stops,65 it seems much harder for a police department to 
sweep a police killing under the proverbial rug. Because of this combination of 
intense media coverage, third-party documentation, and the development of 
three methodologically varied databases, federal policymakers can feel reason-
ably confident that the frequency of police killings will be difficult for a police 
department to hide in the future. 
Third, the number of killings by law enforcement can serve as a valuable, 
albeit highly imperfect, proxy for the presence of systemic misconduct. If a 
police department is involved in a disproportionately large number of police 
killings relative to other comparable police departments, it may be an indicator 
of larger problems within the agency.66 Admittedly, this sort of statistic will 
possibly fail to identify many police departments that are engaged in less seri-
ous misconduct that falls short of a pattern of unjustified police killings. And of 
course not all police killings are unjustified. When encountering an imminent 
threat to themselves or others, police sometimes have to use deadly force. Ad-
ditionally, not all jurisdictions are the same. One may expect police officers in 
dangerous, high-crime jurisdiction neighborhoods to use deadly force more 
often than officers in safe, low-crime jurisdictions. The available data on police 
injuries in the line-of-duty only reaffirms this conclusion.67 For example, police 
officers in larger cities face a higher risk of injury in the line of duty than rural 
                                                                                                                           
 63 Rueben Fischer-Baum, Another (Much Higher) Count of Homicides by Police, FIVETHIR-
TYEIGHT (Aug. 25, 2014), http://fivethirtyeight.com/datalab/another-much-higher-count-of-police-
homicides/ [http://perma.cc/Q82Q-ZGBY] (citing databases of police killings put together by the Gun 
Violence Archive, Deadspin, Fatal Encounters, and even a Facebook page—each of which tends to 
rely heavily on media reports to document the number of police killings of civilians); see also Kyle 
Wagner, We’re Compiling Every Police-Involved Shooting in America. Help Us., REGRESSING (Aug. 
20, 2014), http://regressing.deadspin.com/were-compiling-every-police-involved-shooting-in-americ-
1624180387 [http://perma.cc/F8R2-737L] (requesting public assistance in gathering police shooting 
data). 
 64 Zimring, supra note 62 (using this methodology to verify the authenticity of homicide records 
in New York City). This is presumably why the BJS will scour media reports and third-party records 
to create their database of police killings. 
 65 See generally Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (holding that it is reasonable for officers to stop 
and frisk citizens). 
 66 An apparent “pattern or practice of use of excessive force, including deadly force, in violation 
of the Fourth Amendment,” is one of the most common justifications for the DOJ to intervene into a 
local police department via § 14141. Albuquerque Investigative Finds Letter from DOJ, supra note 28, 
at 1. For example, in the DOJ investigation of Albuquerque Police Department, the DOJ found that 
“of the 20 officer-involved shootings resulting in fatalities from 2009 to 2012 . . . a majority of these 
shootings were unconstitutional.” Id. at 2–3. 
 67 Uniform Crime Reports: Law Enforcement, supra note 41 (to access data, click on years 2000 
through 2014 under “Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted”). 
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officers. In 2012, for every one hundred police officers in metropolitan coun-
ties, eight were victims of assault in the line of duty.68 By contrast, only about 
4.9 out of every one hundred officers in nonmetropolitan counties were victims 
of assaults over the same time period.69 
Consequently, it would not be fair to judge a police department based 
solely on the number of times that department has utilized deadly force. Any 
analysis of these statistics ought to consider the relative dangerousness of po-
lice department’s jurisdiction as well as other potentially relevant infor-
mation.70 But limitations aside, the DCRA, FBI, and BJS databases have the 
potential to do something important—provide the federal government and the 
public with at least some data by which to identify potentially problematic po-
lice departments that may be engaged in an unusually high amount of violence. 
In addition, the DCRA also requires the U.S. Attorney General to study 
the resulting data on deaths in custody and make recommendations to Congress 
on how the federal government can reduce the number of deaths in custody.71 
Specifically, the Attorney General must “determine the means by which such 
information can be used to reduce the number of [deaths in custody]” and re-
port the results of this study to Congress by no later than December 18, 2016.72 
Thus, in the coming months, the Attorney General’s Office faces a challenge. It 
must determine the best ways to use data on police killings to reduce violence 
by frontline officers. Some have claimed that the mere act of keeping data on 
police killings may be enough to bring about reform in some law enforcement 
agencies.73 But is that enough? Or is there something else the Attorney General 
can do with these newly amassed datasets to reduce police violence? The Parts 
                                                                                                                           
 68 Id. at tbl.66 (under “Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted,” select “2012”; then 
under “Officers Assaulted,” select “Access Tables”; then select “Table 66”). 
 69 Id. 
 70 One possible way to accomplish this goal would be by weighing the frequency of police kill-
ings against the relative dangerousness of each jurisdiction. Dangerousness could be measured by 
using some combination of available statistics of each jurisdiction’s homicide rates or the rate at 
which officers in each jurisdiction suffer injuries in the line of duty. 
 71 42 U.S.C. § 13727(f) (stating “[t]he Attorney General shall carry out a study of the information 
reported under subsection (b) and section 13727a(a) . . . [to] determine means by which such infor-
mation can be used to reduce the number of such deaths”). 
 72 Id. 
 73 See, e.g., Mariel Garza, Police Use of Force: More Clamor and a New Bill Seeking Public 
Accountability, L.A. TIMES (June 3, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/opinion-la/la-ed-police-
use-of-force-0602-story.html [http://perma.cc/G44H-7BCY] (arguing that the presence of more public 
statistics on police use of deadly force will lead to “public accountability”); Urge U.S. Senate to Pass 
the NAACP-Supported Death in Custody Reporting Act When They Return in Sept, NAACP, http://
www.naacp.org/action-alerts/entry/urge-u.s.-senate-to-pass-the-naacp-supported-death-in-custody-
reporting-act [http://perma.cc/5TXP-RZFS] (explaining to its members that the passage of this bill 
will “alleviate the environment of suspicion, concern and mistrust that currently exists in many racial 
and ethnic minority communities across America”). 
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that follow consider several ways the Attorney General could harness these 
datasets to combat violence in local police departments.   
II. THE BENEFITS AND LIMITATIONS OF TRANSPARENCY 
It is imperative that the Attorney General makes DCRA, FBI, and BJS da-
ta on police violence, including circumstantial and demographic information, 
publicly accessible. The FBI has made it clear that it intends to make any data 
it obtains publicly available as soon as possible.74 However as written, the 
DCRA does not explicitly require the Attorney General to do so.75 At least 
some policing advocates have worried that the recent public attention given to 
allegations of police misconduct has made officers tentative in proactively po-
licing the streets.76 Some, like FBI Director James B. Comey, have suggested 
that additional scrutiny on law enforcement may contribute to increases in 
crime.77 But in this case, the benefits of transparency outweigh any potential 
objections. By making this data publicly accessible, federal policymakers can 
incentivize police departments to implement policies aimed at curbing police 
violence. Ultimately, though, this Part argues that transparency alone will be 
insufficient to bring about proactive reform in all police departments. A number 
of political, structural, and organizational barriers may discourage some munic-
ipalities from implementing reform measures aimed at curbing police violence, 
even if these datasets are made readily available to the public. Thus the sec-
tions below consider the benefits and limitations of transparency. 
A. The Benefits of Transparency: Empowering Bottom-Up Reform 
By making all of this new data public, federal policymakers could im-
prove transparency in local police conduct and incentivize some police de-
partments to institute policies aimed at reducing police violence. Currently, the 
                                                                                                                           
 74 Kindy, supra note 8 (describing how the data will be “collected and shared with the public”). 
 75 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 13727(f) (West 2014) (only requiring the Attorney General to release the 
results of a study on how the federal government can use DCRA statistics to reduce police violence). 
 76 See, e.g., Todd C. Frankel, DEA Chief Joins FBI Chief in Giving Credence to ‘Ferguson Ef-
fect,’ WASH. POST (Nov. 4, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2015/11/
04/dea-chief-joins-fbi-chief-in-giving-credence-to-ferguson-effect/ [http://perma.cc/ZV87-2EXD] 
(describing how the head of the Drug Enforcement Agency has also suggested that the increase in 
scrutiny of law enforcement may make cops hesitant or less effective); Janell Ross, The ‘Ferguson 
Effect’ Creates an Ill-Timed Rift Between the FBI and the White House, WASH. POST (Oct. 27, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2015/10/27/the-ferguson-effect-creates-an-ill-time
d-rift-between-the-fbi-and-the-white-house/ [http://perma.cc/U9KF-32KE] (explaining existing theo-
ries about how scrutiny on police may contribute to reductions in aggressiveness or increases in 
crime). 
 77 Wesley Lowery, FBI Chief Again Says Ferguson Having Chilling Effect on Law Enforcement, 
WASH. POST (Oct. 26, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/fbi-chief-again-says-ferguson-
having-chilling-effect-on-law-enforcement/2015/10/26/c51011d4-7c2c-11e5-afce-2afd1d3eb896_story. 
html [http://perma.cc/VJP8-8WKY]. 
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public has access to very few national statistics on local police departments.78 
Virtually all data on local law enforcement behavior come from a handful of 
self-reported databases on jurisdictional crime rates and departmental charac-
teristics. For example, the FBI maintains the Uniform Crime Reports (“UCR”), 
which aggregates annual crime statistics for jurisdictions across the country 
using uniform formulas.79 The federal government also maintains the Law En-
forcement Management and Administrative Statistics (“LEMAS”), a database 
that includes self-reported information on internal departmental budgets, ex-
penditures, salaries, demographics, equipment, and training requirements, 
among other variables.80 Unlike the UCR, the federal government only com-
piles LEMAS data periodically (every three to four years) from a smaller 
number of law enforcement agencies.81 While databases like UCR and LE-
MAS provide useful information on local police departments, they provide 
little insight on the frequency of police violence against civilians. Currently, 
the best government database on deaths in custody is the Supplementary Hom-
icide Report, compiled as part of the UCR.82 Police departments “are request-
ed—but not required—to provide information to the Supplementary Homicide 
Report” on civilians deaths at the hands of law enforcement.83 This has led one 
scholar to suggest that the Supplementary Homicide Report only includes 
“around 80 percent of total civilian killings.”84  
In addition to government databases, a number of media sources have at-
tempted to estimate the total number of individuals killed by law enforcement 
each year.85 For instance, the “The Counted” project by The Guardian encour-
ages users to send tips about individuals killed by law enforcement. The news-
paper then aggregates this information into a user-friendly interface that in-
cludes photographs, circumstantial information, and demographics.86 In prac-
tice though, these crowdsourcing efforts alone produce incomplete and imper-
fect databases.87 
By contrast, the DCRA, FBI, and BJS databases should combine to pro-
duce useful data on the frequency of deadly force across different law en-
                                                                                                                           
 78 See supra note 3 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of data on police shootings of 
civilians). 
 79 Uniform Crime Reports: Crime, supra note 43. 
 80 LEMAS, supra note 43. 
 81 See id. (describing LEMAS surveys as occurring every three to four years and explaining how 
the 2007 sample included 3095 agencies). 
 82 Zimring, supra note 62. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. 
 85 See supra note 11 and accompanying text (describing media estimates based on crowdsourcing 
data). 
 86 The Counted: People Killed by Police in the US, supra note 11. 
 87 See, e.g., id. (showing that many of the entries on The Guardian website include virtually no 
information on victims’ names, ages, races, or circumstances). 
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forcement agencies. Remember, the DCRA requires localities to report an ar-
ray of information, including a description of the circumstances leading to the 
killing and information about the race, gender, ethnicity, and age of the vic-
tim.88 The FBI and BJS are also seeking similarly “granular” data.89 This in-
formation goes far beyond what is currently available to the public via the 
UCR, Supplementary Homicide Reports, or media crowdsourcing efforts 
alone. If made publicly available, this data will allow police departments to 
understand in clear terms how they compare to their peers in use of deadly 
force. Mere access to this information may motivate some police departments 
to take proactive steps to implement policies that reduce police violence.  
Transparency will also empower the public, the press, and interest groups 
to oversee local police conduct. In recent years, the United States has seen an 
explosion of public interest in police conduct. In many major cities, “cop-
watching” groups—“groups of local residents who wear uniforms, carry visi-
ble recording devices, patrol neighborhoods, and film citizen-police interac-
tions”—have taken an active role in overseeing police behavior.90 These cop-
watching groups have emerged in Berkeley, Los Angeles, Austin, New York, 
Richmond, Portland, Atlanta, Minneapolis, and other cities.91 The Black Lives 
Matter movement has produced protests in cities and on college campuses 
across the country.92 These groups add to the list of existing civil rights groups 
                                                                                                                           
 88 42 U.S.C. § 13727(b) (requiring agencies to report “the name, gender, race, ethnicity, and age 
of the deceased; the date, time and location of death; . . . and a brief description of the circumstances 
surrounding the death”). 
 89 Kindy, supra note 8 (quoting Morris as stating that the data will be “‘much more granular’ than 
in the past and will probably include the gender and race of officers and suspects involved in these 
encounters, the level of the threat or danger the officer faced, and the types of weapons yielded by 
either party”); McCarthy, supra note 11 (explaining that the BJS project involves the administration of 
a questionnaire that asks the “decedent’s name, age, date of death and the law enforcement agency 
involved”). 
 90 Jocelyn Simonson, Copwatching, 104 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 1) (on 
file with author). 
 91 Id. at 60 (showing a full list of copwatching groups that Professor Simonson interviewed as 
part of her article). Presumably, the list provided by Professor Simonson is not inclusive of the entire 
field of copwatching, but rather an indication that copwatching groups exist in, at minimum, these 
listed communities. 
 92 See, e.g., Charlotte Alter, Protests Erupt in Minneapolis After Police Shoot Black Man, TIME 
(Nov. 16, 2015), http://time.com/4114447/minneapolis-black-lives-matters-protests-police-shooting/ 
[http://perma.cc/FGL2-LZPY] (describing protests in Minneapolis by Black Lives Matter activists 
after the shooting of unarmed twenty-four-year-old Jamar Clark); Shelby Grad, How Black Lives 
Matter Became a Thorn in the Side of L.A. Leaders, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 20, 2015), http://www.latimes.
com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-how-black-lives-matter-became-a-thorn-in-the-side-for-l-a-leaders-story-
so-far-20151020-htmlstory.html [http://perma.cc/G3YD-XER8] (describing Black Lives Matter pro-
tests in Los Angeles); Sandhya Somashekhar, How Black Lives Matter, Born on the Streets, Is Rising 
to Power on Campus, WASH. POST (Nov. 17, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/how-
black-lives-matter-born-on-the-streets-is-rising-to-power-on-campus/2015/11/17/3c113e96-8959-
11e5-be8b-1ae2e4f50f76_story.html [http://perma.cc/2ZYF-G9Y4] (describing the rise of Black Lives 
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with a longtime interest in police violence, like the American Civil Liberties 
Union.93 
Historically, we have seen a troubling pattern in how some police depart-
ments respond to incidents of misconduct. A video emerges of alleged miscon-
duct by a police officer.94 Community groups immediately express outrage and 
demand reform. In response, police leaders deflect these calls for reform by 
arguing that misconduct was an isolated incident.95 After all, every large organ-
ization will have a few bad apples. In the absence of any national statistics on 
local behavior, it can be difficult for the public, the press, or interest groups to 
prove that an individual act of police misconduct is connected to a broader 
problem within a police department.  
These new datasets may provide an opportunity to break this cycle. If 
made available to the public, the press and interest groups could use DCRA, 
FBI, and BJS statistics to compare the rate of police killings across different 
municipalities in the country. These groups could even investigate patterns of 
deaths in custody by race, gender, age, or other demographic characteristics to 
uncover potentially problematic patterns. These datasets will hardly capture the 
full range of police misconduct. But by giving these groups access to this in-
formation, federal policymakers may be able to empower these groups to bol-
ster demands for reform. This could, in turn, motivate local police departments 
to institute preemptive reforms aimed at reducing the frequency of police vio-
lence. 
B. The Limitations of Data Transparency 
Transparency may spur some bottom-up reform in some local police de-
partments. But history suggests that transparency alone may not be enough to 
bring about change in all police departments engaged in excessive violence. 
                                                                                                                           
Matter groups at Columbia University, Kalamazoo College, Wesleyan University, Georgetown Uni-
versity, and the University of Cincinnati). 
 93 For an example of the work done by the ACLU to investigate and lobby against police miscon-
duct, see Robinson Meyer, Film the Police: A New App Makes It Easier, THE ATLANTIC (May 6, 
2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2015/05/film-the-police/392483/ [http://perma.
cc/84QY-FUBA] (describing a mobile phone application that encourages people to film police con-
duct and have the video automatically uploaded to “servers owned by the American Civil Liberties 
Union” ensuring that “[e]ven if the phone is destroyed, the video will survive”). The ACLU has also 
been instrumental in lobbying against the use of stop-and-frisk procedures by police officers. For an 
example of this, see Associated Press, Chicago Stop-and-Frisk to Be Monitored, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 8, 
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/09/us/chicago-stop-and-frisk-to-be-monitored.html [http://
perma.cc/C6LP-SMVN]. 
 94 See, e.g., Harmon, supra note 32, at 12 n.31 (describing the release of the George Holliday 
video in Los Angeles showing the beating of Rodney King). 
 95 See, e.g., David Parrish, Police ‘Street Justice’ Called Normal Conduct, DAILY NEWS, Mar. 10, 
1991, at N1 (quoting Chief Gates as saying that the event was an aberration, and that “[i]t’s not the 
kind of conduct that we have normally from our officers”). 
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This inconsistency underscores, perhaps, the biggest problem facing American 
policing today. Misconduct does not affect all police departments equally. In-
stead, the United States likely suffers from a handful of problematic police de-
partments that are engaged in a pattern of unconstitutional misconduct. This 
section discusses conditions that lead to the existence of a handful of problem-
atic police departments in the United States. Several inherent characteristics of 
American policing—local political accountability, decentralization, significant 
frontline discretion, and the general lack of federal oversight—lead to wide 
discrepancies in American police departments. Additionally, police misconduct 
often affects politically marginalized or unpopular minorities.96 The cost of 
addressing systemic misconduct is high—sometimes requiring communities to 
reallocate scarce resources—and local police unions sometimes resist oversight 
mechanisms.97 
Given these barriers, it is impractical to expect all localities to address vi-
olence within their ranks without additional top-down incentives. This suggests 
that federal policymakers should look to combine data transparency with other 
mechanisms in order to bring about a meaningful reduction in police violence.  
1. Discretion in Frontline Policing 
American police departments necessarily give frontline officers a signifi-
cant amount of discretion.98 This discretion is an important factor to consider, 
as it makes the documentation of police behavior particularly challenging. The 
academic literature has long observed that, as frontline workers, police officers 
need discretion to complete their jobs.99 If police did not have the ability to 
exercise discretion, and instead had to strictly enforce every rule of law, “the 
criminal law would be ordered but intolerable.”100 This reality has been well 
                                                                                                                           
 96 See infra notes 179–185 and accompanying text (using Maricopa County, Arizona as an exam-
ple of a location where police misconduct has disproportionately affected Latinos, a minority group in 
the county). 
 97 See infra notes 201–203 and accompanying text (using the reforms in Los Angeles, Cleveland, 
and New Orleans as examples of the costs associated with efforts to reduce police misconduct). 
 98 Charles D. Breitel, Controls in Criminal Law Enforcement, 27 U. CHI. L. REV. 427, 427 (1960) 
(explaining the necessity of discretion in police work and defining discretion as “the power to consid-
er all circumstances and then determine whether any legal action is to be taken . . . [a]nd if so taken, of 
what kind and degree, and to what conclusion”). 
 99 The academic literature has generally observed two different types of discretion in police 
work—discretion about which laws to enforce and discretion about how to enforce those laws. For 
examples of discretion in how officers enforce the law, see generally MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-
LEVEL BUREAUCRACY: DILEMMAS OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN PUBLIC SERVICE (2d ed. 2010) (recogniz-
ing in this hallmark book within socio-legal studies how police, as street-level bureaucrats, have the 
ability to exercise significant influence over how public policy is actually carried out); STEVEN 
MAYNARD-MOODY & MICHAEL MUSHENO, COPS, TEACHERS, COUNSELORS: STORIES FROM THE 
FRONT LINES OF PUBLIC SERVICE (2003) (describing how street-level bureaucrats like police officers 
have to deal with competing tensions of law abidance and cultural abidance). 
 100 Breitel, supra note 98, at 427. 
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understood going back to the President’s Commission on Law Enforcement 
and Administration of Justice, which recognized the importance of discretion. 
The authors of that report noted that police “are charged with performing [their 
jobs] where all eyes are upon them and where the going is always roughest—
on the streets.”101 A police officer’s job also requires interaction with individu-
als at their most vulnerable and desperate.102 Much of the day-to-day work that 
police officers complete could be more accurately described as unstructured 
counseling; officers must calm everyday altercations, handle public nuisances, 
and offer assistance to “whoever needs help whether they want it or not.”103 
Although this kind of discretion is a necessary part of policing, certain officers 
granted such authority will abuse it. The “supervision of subordinates with 
broad discretion and responsibilities” is especially tough, meaning that superi-
ors cannot possibly “hold officers accountable for everything all the time.”104 
Some misconduct is an unavoidable result of empowering frontline workers 
with considerable discretion. In the last century, the academic literature has 
recognized countless examples of how police discretion is invariably tied to 
some misconduct. 
One of the first national recognitions of widespread misconduct among 
police officers came in 1931, when the National Commission on Law Ob-
servance and Enforcement, appointed by President Herbert Hoover and com-
monly referred to as the Wickersham Commission, released a series of re-
ports.105 Perhaps the most famous one was entitled the Report on Lawlessness 
in Law Enforcement. Some policing scholars have called it “one of the most 
                                                                                                                           
 101 PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENF’T & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN 
A FREE SOCIETY 91 (1967) [hereinafter PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENF’T]. 
 102 Id. (stating that “[p]olicemen deal with people when they are both most threatening and most 
vulnerable, when they are angry, when they are frightened, when they are desperate, when they are 
drunk, when they are violent, and when they are ashamed”). 
 103 Id. at 91–92 (making this comparison to counseling and providing additional examples of the 
counseling-type role that police must adopt). 
 104 LIPSKY, supra note 99, at 164. 
 105 Dwight C. Smith Jr., Wickersham to Sutherland to Katzenbach: Evolving an “Official” Defini-
tion for Organized Crime, 16 CRIME L. & SOC. CHANGE 135, 135 (1991). George W. Wickersham, who 
served as the U.S. Attorney General under President William Howard Taft, chaired the Commission. 
RECORDS OF THE WICKERSHAM COMMISSION ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, at v (Samuel 
Walker ed., 1997), http://www.lexisnexis.com/documents/academic/upa_cis/1965_Wickersham
CommPt1.pdf [http://perma.cc/EX9E-ZXJZ]. Prominent legal scholars and policymakers also sat on 
the Commission, including Harvard Law School Dean Roscoe Pound and former U.S. Secretary of 
War Newton D. Baker. Id. In total, the Wickersham Commission issued fourteen reports on a wide 
range of criminal justice issues. Richard A. Leo, From Coercion to Deception: The Changing Nature 
of Police Interrogation in America, 18 CRIME L. & SOC. CHANGE 35, 38 (1992). These reports were 
unique in part because they represented objective, technocratic approaches to understanding the prob-
lems plaguing the criminal justice system. RECORDS OF THE WICKERSHAM COMMISSION, supra, at v 
(explaining the detailed and objective approach used by the authors of the reports). 
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important events in the history of American policing.”106 The report claimed 
“in uncompromising language” that police at the time regularly used physical 
brutality, threats, illegal detentions, and cruelty during interrogations to obtain 
involuntary confession—something the authors of the report referred to as the 
“third degree.”107 The authors found that police agencies across the country 
utilized third-degree tactics.108 They denied suspects the right to a lawyer dur-
ing interrogations.109 And they held suspects incommunicado for long periods 
of time in hopes of extorting a confession.110 One of the root causes of this 
abuse was the fact that police officers necessarily need discretion to interrogate 
suspects, as it would be “impossible to lay down strict general rules covering 
all situations.”111 
Since the Report on Lawlessness in Law Enforcement, “no fewer than six 
national commissions [have] examined various dimensions” of police miscon-
duct in the United States.112 These reports, along with other academic research, 
have found certain categories of misconduct to be common across different 
policing agencies: racial profiling, excessive uses-of-force, unlawful searches 
and seizures, failures to cooperate with investigations involving fellow officers, 
dishonesty at trial, and the planting of evidence.113 Although the granting of 
discretion makes some amount of misconduct inevitable, empirical evidence 
                                                                                                                           
 106 RECORDS OF THE WICKERSHAM COMMISSION, supra note 105, at v. Although many of the 
Commission’s reports had little immediate effect on public policy, the Report on Lawlessness in Law 
Enforcement (“the Wickersham Report”) did motivate major changes in policing policy. NAT’L 
COMM’N ON LAW OBSERVANCE & ENF’T, REPORT ON LAWLESSNESS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 3 
(1931); see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 446 (1966) (citing the Wickersham Report and the 
presence of the third degree, a term used in the report, as a partial rationale for barring interrogations 
absent authorized warnings). It is also worth mentioning that it remains unclear why the Commission 
chose to investigate policing, as there was “no political constituency with any strength at the national 
level demanding a federal investigation” into police misconduct. RECORDS OF THE WICKERSHAM 
COMMISSION, supra note 105, at viii. The ACLU and the NAACP were relatively small and weak 
interest groups at the time. Id. So the best historical evidence suggests that the report was not the re-
sult of “conventional interest group lobbying.” Id. The three consultants who prepared the report were 
civil liberty advocates, which likely framed the tone of the report. Id. 
 107 RECORDS OF THE WICKERSHAM COMMISSION, supra note 105, at ix; see also NAT’L COMM’N 
ON LAW OBSERVANCE & ENF’T, supra note 106, at 3 (using the “third degree” terminology and ex-
plaining the commonality of this “secret” and “illegal” practice). 
 108 NAT’L COMM’N ON LAW OBSERVANCE & ENF’T, supra note 106, at 4 (stating that the use of 
these tactics is “widespread” across departments in the United States). 
 109 Id. (identifying these categories). 
 110 Id. (further explaining how there was a “practice of holding the accused incommunicado, 
unable to get in touch with their family or friends or counsel,” that is “so frequent that in places there 
are cells called ‘incommunicado cells’”). 
 111 Id. at 175. 
 112 Michael C. Scott, Progress in American Policing? Reviewing the National Reviews, 34 LAW 
& SOC’Y 171, 172 (2008). 
 113 Kami Chavis Simmons, New Governance and the “New Paradigm” of Police Accountability: 
A Democratic Approach to Police Reform, 59 CATH. U. L. REV. 373, 380 (2010) (citing each of these 
as examples of common misconduct issues identified over the years). 
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from the last several decades has shown that certain departments had more ap-
parent misconduct than others. Some of the first solid, evidence for this propo-
sition emerged around the end of the twentieth century when Congress asked 
the DOJ to compile records on the number of complaints filed at the national 
level against local police agencies.114 The results showed that certain police 
agencies—like those in New Orleans and Los Angeles—were the source of 
significantly more federal complaints for police wrongdoing than other major 
metropolitan areas.115 This finding led policymakers to ask an obvious ques-
tion: Why do some police departments have more misconduct than others? 
What was different about New Orleans or Los Angeles that led to more appar-
ent misconduct? 
The answer, according to many policing scholars, is differences in organi-
zational cultures and differences in internal policies to oversee and regulate the 
use of discretion. Policing scholars have increasingly recognized that “the roots 
of police misconduct rest within the organizational culture of policing.”116 Po-
lice departments that implicitly condone wrongdoing through the use of “lax 
supervision and inadequate investigation” techniques are more likely to see 
ongoing misconduct than departments that aggressively enforce internal regu-
lations.117 And the reason that departments can have such widely disparate in-
ternal policies, procedures, and cultures is because of the decentralization of 
American law enforcement, combined with the lack of mandatory federal over-
sight. 
2. Decentralization of American Law Enforcement 
Policing in the United States has long been among the most decentralized 
institutions in the criminal justice system. In many countries, the central gov-
ernment regulates local police through a hierarchical, top-down approach.118 In 
                                                                                                                           
 114 See Federal Response to Police Misconduct: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Civil & 
Constitutional Rights of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 92–162 (1992) (showing the 
results from a DOJ study from 1985–90 on the number of complaints sent to the federal government 
about police misconduct for each jurisdiction). 
 115 Id. at 152 (showing New Orleans and Los Angeles County as the top locations for miscon-
duct). 
 116 Simmons, supra note 22, at 505; see INDEP. COMM’N ON THE L.A. POLICE DEP’T, REPORT OF 
THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON THE L.A. POLICE DEPARTMENT, at iv (1991) [hereinafter CHRIS-
TOPHER COMM’N REPORT] (linking the LAPD’s organizational mismanagement to misconduct); see 
also Armacost, supra note 21, at 493–94 (explaining how organizational culture can facilitate police 
brutality); ALLYSON COLLINS, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE: POLICE AC-
COUNTABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES 1, 33, 45 (1998) (detailing organizational contributors to po-
lice misconduct). 
 117 Debra Livingston, Police Reform and the Department of Justice: An Essay on Accountability, 
2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 815, 816 (1999). 
 118 Michael Sadykiewics, Police Structure: Centralized/Decentralized, in LARRY E. SULLIVAN ET 
AL., ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW ENFORCEMENT 1250, 1251 (Marie Simonetti Rosen et al. eds., 2004), 
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these countries, central headquarters exercise direct authority over local law 
enforcement agencies.119 By contrast, the United States is among a small hand-
ful of countries where state, municipal, or local governments deputize their 
own, largely independent police forces.120 Decentralization has always been an 
accepted part of American law enforcement. But why has the United States 
taken such a radically different approach to policing than its global counterparts? 
The answer lies in the U.S. Constitution.121 Since the federal government only 
has a handful of limited, enumerated powers, most governing responsibilities fall 
onto state governments. One of the most important responsibilities of the state 
government is to decide how to allocate the burden of governmental regulation. 
In virtually all cases, state governments have responded to this challenge by 
creating hundreds or thousands of smaller, local government units such as cit-
ies or municipalities.122 The state then typically grants these smaller govern-
mental units authority to handle a host of responsibilities, like local education 
and law enforcement. 
This creation of smaller, local-level governments happens through a pro-
cess known as incorporation.123 For much of the twentieth century, many states 
were wary to grant localities the power to incorporate into their own local gov-
ernments.124 States instead encouraged large, existing cities to annex nearby 
unincorporated areas.125 The prevailing belief was that, although decentraliza-
tion was valuable, extensive decentralization would make government admin-
istration less efficient.126 Around the mid-twentieth century, states started to 
                                                                                                                           
http://knowledge.sagepub.com/view/lawenforcement/n517.xml [http://perma.cc/W3G8-ECXX] (stat-
ing that decentralized structures of law enforcement are less common, and citing various examples of 
centralized policing structures, including France, Italy, Sweden, Finland, China, Vietnam, and Cuba). 
 119 Id. at 1252–54 (describing by contrast how such centralization does not exist in the United 
States—and in the process describing the model for centralized police structures). 
 120 Id. 
 121 The U.S. Constitution only affords the federal government with a small number of specific, 
enumerated powers. All other powers not specifically enumerated in the Constitution are, in theory, 
left to the state and localities. U.S. CONST. amend. X. Because policing is not among the specific 
enumerated powers granted to the federal government, the power to hire and deputize police officers 
to enforce state laws has fallen outside the legitimate purview of the federal government. 
 122 In 1907, in Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, the U.S. Supreme Court held that state governments 
have nearly complete authority over the creation of local municipalities within their borders. 207 U.S. 
161, 178–79 (1907) (holding that municipal governments exist and serve only with the blessing of the 
state government, which may “at its pleasure . . . modify or withdraw all such powers”). 
 123 Erika K. Wilson, Toward a Theory of Equitable Federated Regionalism in Public Education, 
61 UCLA L. REV. 1416, 1426–29 (2014) (using and defining the terms incorporation and annexation). 
 124 Id. (citing KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE 
UNITED STATES 144 (1985)). 
 125 Id. 
 126 Id. at 1427 (stating that “[t]he preference for annexation during this time reflected an underly-
ing normative belief that larger centralized governance structures were more efficient than smaller 
decentralized governance structures”). 
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implement more permissive standards for incorporation.127 Historians trace 
back this increase in local municipality incorporation to “racial and ethnic 
changes in the demographics of central cities, particularly an influx of Europe-
an immigrants and African American migrants from the South, [which] caused 
suburban residents to resist annexation.”128 
Once states began loosening incorporation requirements, these newly cre-
ated municipalities wasted no time enacting land use, zoning, and tax policies 
that effectively excluded the economically disadvantaged and racial minori-
ties.129 Each of these newly created municipalities typically had a separate po-
lice force. One of the first times that decentralization was tied to misconduct 
regulation was in 1967, when the President’s Commission on Law Enforce-
ment and Administration of Justice issued a report entitled The Challenge of 
Crime in a Free Society.130 In this report, the Commission initially estimated 
there to be around 40,000 policing agencies in the United States.131 The report 
also highlighted how these agencies varied widely from one part of the country 
to another.132 Modern estimates suggest that the overwhelming majority of the 
nation’s active law enforcement officers serve in one of nearly 18,000 local or 
state police agencies.133 
a. Decentralization Results in Demographically Unique Municipalities with 
Disparate Budgets and Challenges 
These permissive state regulations on incorporation inevitably facilitated 
the rise of tens of thousands of autonomous police agencies, each with limited 
jurisdiction over a demographically distinct area. It also resulted in wide varia-
tions from one department to another, even within a single metropolitan area. 
These permissive state regulations on incorporation have thus facilitated the 
creation of demographically varied municipalities, each with drastically differ-
ent budgets and crime problems. Accordingly, each of these thousands of indi-
                                                                                                                           
 127 Id. (“As a result, state laws in relation to unincorporated suburbs began to shift their focus 
away from annexation and toward incorporation.”). 
 128 Id. 
 129 Suburban communities adopted minimum lot size requirements, or single family home re-
strictions, in addition to zoning and other requirements to keep unwanted residents out of their town in 
seemingly race-neutral ways. Id. at 1428. 
 130 PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENF’T, supra note 101, at 91 (beginning the discussion of 
policing by highlighting decentralization and the wide resource disparities between police agencies). 
 131 Id. 
 132 For example, the Commission noted that spending for urban departments was found to be 
around $27.31 per resident per year, while spending in smaller departments was only $8.74 per resi-
dent per year. Id. 
 133 BRIAN A. REAVES, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CENSUS OF 
STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES, 2008, at 2 (2011), http://www.bjs.gov/content/
pub/pdf/csllea08.pdf [http://perma.cc/VS5C-AMMB] (estimating the number of state and local law 
enforcement agencies to be 17,985). 
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vidual police departments must navigate the problems unique to their individu-
al jurisdictions.  
For example, a city like Camden, New Jersey, has among the highest 
crime rates in the nation.134 In 2012, Camden’s murder rate was over eighteen 
times the national average.135 Camden also drastically outpaced the national 
average in overall violent and property crimes rates.136 The average Camden 
resident only makes around $29,118 per year, and over a third of all Camden 
residents live below the poverty line.137 Less than an hour away in the state of 
New Jersey is the Township of Brick, a community of approximately the same 
size as Camden.138 Unlike Camden, Brick reported no murders in 2011 or 
2012, and extremely low violent and property crime rates relative to the na-
tional average.139 The median family income is two to three times higher than 
that in Camden, and only around six percent of the township’s residents live 
under the poverty line.140 It would be fair to say that law enforcement officers 
in Camden are facing a categorically different problem than officers in Brick, 
as demographics suggest that Brick and Camden are entirely different worlds. 
It should come as no surprise that these two cities have adopted radically 
different approaches to policing. Camden has historically lacked the resources 
to hire enough police to patrol the streets. To compensate, Camden has been at 
the forefront in adopting highly efficient surveillance technologies.141 Camden 
                                                                                                                           
 134 See, e.g., Uniform Crime Reports: Crime, supra note 43, tbl.8 (to access crime data for Cam-
den, click on “2012” under “Crime in the United States”; click on “Violent Crime” under “Offenses 
Known to Law Enforcement”; then select “Table 8,” and then “New Jersey”). In 2012, Camden, a city 
of 77,665, had a violent crime rate that translated to 2566.1 crimes per 100,000 residents. This includ-
ed an 86.3 murder rate, a 95.3 rape rate, a 1412.5 assault rate, and a 972.1 robbery rate per 100,000 
residents—all among the highest in the nation. See id. tbl.1 (to access crime data for the nation as a 
whole, click on “2012” under “Crime in the United States”; click on “Violent Crime” under “Offenses 
Known to Law Enforcement”; then select “Table 1”). 
 135 Compare id. tbl.8 (showing Camden’s 2012 murder rate), with id. tbl.1 (showing the murder 
rate in the United States in 2012). 
 136 Compare id. tbl.8 (showing Camden’s 2012 crime rates), with id. tbl.1 (showing crime rates of 
the United States in 2012). 
 137 State & County QuickFacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/
34/3410000.html [https://perma.cc/Y4VQ-3JKL] (showing Camden’s median household income is 
$26,202, and 39.8% of residents live below the poverty line). 
 138 See Uniform Crime Reports: Crime, supra note 43, tbl.8 (showing crime data for Brick Town-
ship, New Jersey). Brick had 75,809 residents in 2012. 
 139 Id. (showing crime data for Brick, New Jersey). In 2012, the overall violent crime rate in Brick 
translated to 106.8 crimes per 100,000 residents, including a murder rate of 0, a rape rate of 7.9, an 
assault rate of 77.9, a robbery rate of 21.2, and a property crime rate of 1642.3. 
 140 QuickFacts, Brick Township, Ocean County, New Jersey, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.
census.gov/quickfacts/table/HSD410214/3402907420,00 [https://perma.cc/9N6P-STF2] (reporting the 
median income for Brick in 2010–14 as $69,063, and that 6.1% of residents live in poverty). 
 141 See generally Conor Friedersdorf, The Surveillance City of Camden, New Jersey, THE AT-
LANTIC (Dec. 12, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/12/the-surveillance-city-
of-camden-new-jersey/282286/ [http://perma.cc/BS88-J7MF] (describing in detail how Camden has 
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has also successfully consolidated its police department with the county-level 
agency to lower costs and avoid duplicative expenditures.142 Brick, on the other 
hand, has not had to adopt such radical approaches to policing, as it has been 
able to maintain extremely low crime rates with relatively few officers per cap-
ita.143 
The vast differences in local approaches to policing evidenced in Camden 
and Brick are not the exception; they appear to be the rule. Federal surveys 
suggest that police departments across the country vary tremendously in size,144 
operating budget,145 officer pay,146 training requirements,147 patrol methods,148 
equipment,149 and on-the-ground strategies.150 Departments vary because of 
both jurisdictional challenges and the availability of local resources, as the 
budgets of law enforcement agencies are almost always tied to the local munic-
ipal budget. These municipalities almost all rely on local property taxes and in 
                                                                                                                           
installed hundreds of surveillance cameras, license plate readers, and other devices to increase the 
efficiency of local law enforcement and help deter crime). 
 142 See Heather Haddon, Crime Dips in Camden as New County Police Force Replaces City Of-
ficers, WALL STREET J. (Aug. 5, 2013), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/ SB10001424127887323
968704578650171849946106 [http://perma.cc/9AYR-YXPL] (detailing the so-called “experiment” 
whereby Camden has closed its city-wide police department and instead relied on the newly expanded 
county department). 
 143 Brick deploys approximately 171.5 police officers per 100,000 residents, around half of what 
Camden deploys. Uniform Crime Reports: Crime, supra note 43, tbl.78 (to obtain data, select “2014” 
under “Crime in the United States”; then under “Police Employment Data,” select “Go to Police Em-
ployee Tables”; then select “Table 78” and then “New Jersey”). 
 144 LEMAS, supra note 43, at 9 tbl.1 (showing that the average number of full-time police offic-
ers per 1000 residents varies depending on the size of the population served). 
 145 Id. at 10 tbl.4 (showing that the largest police departments spend around $385 per city resi-
dent, while the smallest departments spend only $209 per city resident). 
 146 Id. (showing that the largest police departments spend around $121,900 per officer, while the 
smallest departments spend only $56,400 per officer). 
 147 See, e.g., id. at 11–12 & tbl.5 (showing that in larger departments, college degrees are more 
commonly required than in smaller departments); id. fig.6 (showing that larger departments typically 
require more training hours than smaller departments). 
 148 See e.g., id. at 15–16 & tbl.12 (showing the wide variation, largely by size, in the patrol meth-
ods); id. tbl.13 (showing that larger departments are typically more likely to have specific policies to 
deal with special populations and situations). 
 149 See, e.g., id. at 17–18 & tbl.14 (illustrating the disparate use of conducted energy devices in 
larger departments). 
 150 Id. at 27 tbls.30, 31 (describing the variation in strategies used by law enforcement, again 
varying by size of the force). A prime example of departmental variation in internal policies is the 
difference in how agencies respond to alleged misconduct. The LEMAS survey asks departments 
about the existence of internal checks to respond to misconduct. The results suggest that a depart-
ment’s likelihood of using independent oversight tools varies tremendously from department to de-
partment, depending in part on the size of the agency. The vast majority of departments serving popu-
lation centers of more than a million people have a citizen review board (77%) and a substantial num-
ber give this citizen review board independent subpoena power (31%). Id. at 18 (reproducing the data 
from Table 15, entitled “Use-of-force policies and procedures in local police departments, by size of 
population served, 2007”). Among smaller departments, these sorts of extensive oversight measures 
are virtually nonexistent. Id. 
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some cases sales taxes. Thus, jurisdictions with a large concentration of poor 
residents, like Camden, often cannot afford to invest the same amount of mon-
ey into their police departments as municipalities with a higher concentration 
of wealthy residents, like Brick. This is a particularly cruel realization, because 
the communities most adversely affected by resource disparities are often the 
agencies most in need of additional funds to fight crime. Once more, organiza-
tional research suggests that marginal or failing organizations—those failing to 
achieve their intended objectives—are more likely to produce incidents of mis-
conduct.151 This finding theoretically suggests that departments struggling with 
higher crime rates and budgetary problems may have a greater proclivity to-
wards misconduct, while also lacking the resources to fight back. 
Again the comparison between Brick and Camden is useful. Presumably, 
Brick is able to bring in more tax revenue per capita because of higher incomes 
and property values. Thus, we might predict that a community like Brick will 
be able to afford cutting-edge investments into policing. One of these invest-
ments that Brick Township Police Department has been able to afford is ac-
creditation through the Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement 
Agencies (“CALEA”). Departments with accreditation under CALEA are in-
spected periodically by a team of independent, CALEA-trained assessors to 
ensure that the departments are complying with procedural and operational 
standards.152 In 1984, only four agencies were CALEA accredited.153 That 
number rose to forty-seven in 1987, 161 in 1990, 279 in 1993, and 985 by 
2010.154 But accreditation is still voluntary and expensive. Thus, the 985 agen-
cies claiming CALEA accreditation in 2010 represent only 5.6% of all law en-
forcement agencies in the country.155 
Camden, by contrast, has not undergone costly CALEA accreditation. The 
vast resource per capita disparity between the Camden and Brick may partially 
explain this difference. This revelation is important, as it demonstrates how 
resource disparities can directly translate into misconduct disparities. Correct-
ing and preventing misconduct can be expensive. Many of the reforms required 
for voluntary accreditation via CALEA have been shown to reduce civil liabil-
ity exposure, presumably by decreasing the rate of wrongdoing. Evidence has 
also shown that the move towards accreditation and uniformity to national 
                                                                                                                           
 151 Diane Vaughan, The Dark Sides of Organizations: Mistakes, Misconduct, and Disaster, 25 
ANN. REV. SOCIOLOGY 271, 288 (1999). 
 152 The Commission, COMM’N ON ACCREDITATION FOR LAW ENF’T AGENCIES, http://www.calea.
org/content/commission [http://perma.cc/Q55F-X96K].  
 153 COMM’N ON ACCREDITATION FOR LAW ENF’T AGENCIES, ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2010, at 3 
(2011), http://www.calea.org/content/calea-2010-annual-report [http://perma.cc/T2ZN-B7PA]. 
 154 Id. 
 155 There are approximately 17,985 state and local law enforcement agencies in the United States. 
REAVES, supra note 133, at 2. Thus, to calculate this percentage, divide the 985 CALEA accredited 
agencies by the 17,985 total agencies in the country that could have been nationally accredited. 
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standards has made departments more receptive to shifting norms in policies 
and procedures.156 But decentralization, which causes resource disparities, 
means that not all departments can even afford to invest in misconduct-
deterring reforms like accreditation. 
b. Decentralized Police Agencies Rely on Local Political Preferences to 
Guide Policies 
Given that political decentralization has created tens of thousands of local 
police agencies, the next obvious question is how local police agencies develop 
strategies to police their unique municipalities. In such a decentralized envi-
ronment, most agencies take their cues from local political preferences. This 
has devastating effects on politically powerless minorities in some jurisdic-
tions. Historically, the influence of local preferences on police agencies has 
varied over time. The community policing movement has likely increased the 
sensitivity of local police departments to majoritarian preferences. In the early 
part of the twentieth century, the “degree of localism” in policing created a 
“decentralization . . . that often resembled fragmentation.”157 The lack of cen-
tral regulation in policing contributed to local police departments that were 
“inward-looking” for policies and procedures, and “hermetically sealed” from 
outside influences.158 Rather than coordinating with other police departments to 
develop best practices, police departments were most heavily influenced by 
local political leaders.159 This turned many early police departments into mere 
adjuncts to political machines rather than neutral arbiters of the law, and led to 
substantial variation in policing styles.160 
During the mid-twentieth century, policing went through a period of pro-
fessionalization that increased cooperation and coordination between local 
agencies.161 No longer were police departments rigidly sealed from other law 
                                                                                                                           
 156 Terry Gingerich & Gregory Russell, Accreditation and Community Policing: Are They Neu-
tral, Hostile, or Synergistic? An Empirical Test Among Street Cops and Management Cops, 2 JUST. 
POL’Y J. 3–27 (1996). 
 157 FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CITY THAT BECAME SAFE 103 (2011). 
 158 Id. 
 159 LEONARD A. STEVERSON, POLICING IN AMERICA: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 16–18 (2007) 
(offering some examples about how the political patronage influence on policing led to exploitation); 
see also George L. Kelling & Mark H. Moore, The Evolving Strategy of Policing, PERSPECTIVES ON 
POLICING (Nat’l Inst. of Justice, Wash., D.C.), Nov. 1988, at 1, 3, https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/
nij/114213.pdf [https://perma.cc/M3TN-9QYL] (stating that political influences were important dur-
ing the patronage policing era and explaining that police historically “lacked the powerful, central 
authority of their own to establish a legitimate, unifying mandate for their enterprise”). 
 160 See ROBERT M. FOGELSON, BIG-CITY POLICE 37 (1977) (describing big-city police as “ad-
juncts of the ward organizations”). 
 161 See Kelling & Moore, supra note 159, at 4 (explaining how police leaders like August 
Vollmer “rallied police executives around the idea of reform during the 1920s and early 1930s” and 
galvanized a broader movement towards professionalization). 
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enforcement agencies. By the 1940s and 1950s, “it had become clear that the 
only way to gain the public’s trust and respect was to reduce the influence of 
politicians, train and educate police officers, and promote an image of profes-
sionalism in the eyes of the public.”162 This movement towards police profes-
sionalism reflected many beliefs of the time period: that police ought to focus 
on crime suppression; that police should be free from political influence; that 
police should feel free to act objectively and scientifically; and that depart-
mental authority ought to be centralized and rationalized.163 During this period, 
many police departments around the country operated by a core set of beliefs 
and practices.164 The ranks of police agencies were also increasingly unionized 
and protected by civil service laws—somewhat insulating these officers from 
political influences. And in some cases, executives within police departments 
were also protected from political influence via civil service laws.165  
But by the 1980s, support for this so-called professional policing style 
waned. Empirical evidence suggested that some of the primary crime preven-
tion tactics advocated by the professionalization movement were largely inef-
fective.166 And many scholars believed that the professional policing model had 
                                                                                                                           
 162 MITCHEL P. ROTH, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT: A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
259 (2d ed. 2010). Notable figures like William H. Parker, Orlando W. Wilson, and August Vollmer 
personified this gradual transformation. 
 163 David A. Sklansky, The Persistent Pull of Police Professionalism, NEW PERSPECTIVES ON 
POLICING (Nat’l Inst. of Justice, Wash., D.C.), Mar. 2011, at 1, 1, https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/
232676.pdf [https://perma.cc/W7BB-K7AX]. 
 164 Police saw their primary obligations as the investigation of crime, the enforcement of a wide 
variety of criminal laws, and the maintenance of order. Id. (explaining the focus of the professional 
policing era on crime control, law enforcement, and maintenance of order). 
 165 Los Angeles is a good example of a department that afforded executives within the LAPD 
with protection from firing or discipline at the hands of political officials. After the Rodney King 
beating, the City of Los Angeles passed City Charter Amendment F to give political officials authority 
to remove a police chief. See MERRICK BOBB ET AL., FIVE YEARS LATER: A REPORT TO THE LOS 
ANGELES COMMISSION ON THE LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT’S IMPLEMENTATION OF INDE-
PENDENT COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS 67– 68 (1996). 
 166 Common wisdom of the time suggested that police presence could deter crime, “and the most 
popular version of police crime prevention practice by the 1960s was what was called preventative 
patrol, usually the patrol activities of uniformed officers in marked cars conducting routine surveil-
lance of designated geographic zones.” ZIMRING, supra note 157, at 103. And despite the allegedly 
objective and scientific focus on professional policing, departments did virtually no research into the 
effectiveness of preventative patrols. See id. at 103–04 (describing the orthodox, albeit untested, con-
clusion around 1960 about how police could most effectively reduce crime and fight disorder—
including through measures like preventative patrols). The first rigorous investigation of the effects of 
policing on crime came in 1974, when several social scientists teamed with large American police 
departments to assess empirically the effects of preventative patrols on criminal activity in Kansas 
City and Newark. See id. at 104–07 (discussing the “revolutionary” uniqueness of the Kansas City 
study and also discussing the importance of the follow-up study in Newark). There, law enforcement 
purposefully altered the presence of preventative patrols in certain parts of the city to observe the 
effects on crime rates. Id. at 105 (summarizing the methodology of the Kansas City study). In both 
cases, the researchers found that the changes had little to no effect on crime. See GEORGE L. KELLING 
ET AL., THE KANSAS CITY PREVENTATIVE PATROL EXPERIMENT: A TECHNICAL REPORT 16–20 
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become “thoroughly discredited” as many blamed the policing style “for mak-
ing police departments insular, arrogant, resistant to outside criticism and feck-
less in responding to social ferment.”167 This drop in support motivated de-
partments to seek new strategies—particularly those that sought input from the 
community. 
Thus in recent decades, there has been a growing push for police agencies 
to seek out community input and adopt policies that comport with local prefer-
ences. Known as community policing, this movement has sought to incorporate 
the community more in the decision-making process.168 It was spurred in part 
because of the growing civil unrest and major urban riots against American law 
enforcement in the 1960s and 1970s.169 These major riots struck cities across 
the country, including New York, Los Angeles, Newark, and Detroit.170 The 
National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders of 1970 later determined 
that police misconduct—including aggressive patrols and harassment in urban 
communities—contributed substantially to these events.171 This finding demon-
strated the apparent divide between law enforcement and the community it 
served.172 It also further emphasized the need for policing procedures that in-
corporated the input of the community. In response, law enforcement moved 
away from a purely professional and technocratic approach and instead turned 
towards the community for assistance.173 This shift was due in part to an under-
standing that “[c]ommunities with different problems and varied resources to 
                                                                                                                           
(1974) (noting that placing patrols in high crime areas had a negligible effect on crime rates); GEORGE 
L. KELLING & ANTHONY PATE, THE NEWARK FOOT PATROL EXPERIMENT 122–24 (1981) (same). 
Around this same time, several notable social scientists undertook the first significant empirical stud-
ies of policing behavior. See generally EGON BITTNER, THE FUNCTIONS OF THE POLICE IN MODERN 
SOCIETY: A REVIEW OF BACKGROUND FACTORS, CURRENT PRACTICES, AND POSSIBLE ROLE MOD-
ELS (1970) (analyzing the basic character of police work); ALBERT J. REISS, THE POLICE AND THE 
PUBLIC (1971) (documenting the interaction between the police and the public); JEROME H. 
SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL: LAW ENFORCEMENT IN DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY (1966) (study-
ing police culture, accountability, and the application of the rule of law). Many of these early explora-
tions of policing and crime control involved a technique called embedded observation, where social 
scientists observed police officers in action. See ZIMRING, supra note 157, at 104 (describing method-
ology used in many of the earliest empirical analyses of police behavior). 
 167 Sklansky, supra note 163, at 5. 
 168 Id. at 1–2 (categorizing as community policing the move towards selecting and pursuing goals 
in consultation with the public). 
 169 See, e.g., MICHAEL PALMIOTTO, COMMUNITY POLICING: A POLICE-CITIZEN PARTNERSHIP 13 
(2011) (stating “police actions would precipitate a riot because of exaggerated rumors”). 
 170 Id. (citing riots in Harlem (New York City), Watts (Los Angeles), Newark, and Detroit). 
 171 Id. at 13–14 (citing aggressive patrols and harassment as major police precipitators of unrest). 
 172 Id. (discussing the emergence of various segmented opposition groups). 
 173 Id. at 4 (distinguishing between bureaucratic or technocratic philosophies and more collabora-
tive approaches). 
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bring to bear against them should try different things.”174 Thus, the community 
policing movement was about fundamentally changing the decision-making 
within departments.175  
The incorporation of citizen involvement in the organizational decision-
making process means that policing can look very different from one decentral-
ized police agency to another. Studies have found that although the use of 
community policing can increase the overall trust and confidence in law en-
forcement within a local jurisdiction, minority groups commonly feel that their 
voices are not heard.176 Minority residents also have reported that, despite the 
fact that they are often most commonly victims of crime and police brutality, 
they still have little say in the departmental policies or procedures.177 Instead, 
community policing transfers that power to whatever group is in the majority 
within the political constituency of a policing agency. Regardless of these con-
cerns, the federal government has invested significant resources in encouraging 
local agencies to adopt community policing approaches; and it seems to be 
working, as most departments claim to utilize community policing strategies to 
decide how to allocate their resources and interact with the community.178 
c. Reliance on Local Majoritarian Preferences Facilitates Minority 
Subjugation 
As described above, the structural decentralization of American law en-
forcement combined with the recent emphasis on satisfying local community 
                                                                                                                           
 174 Wesley G. Skogan, The Promise of Community Policing, in POLICE INNOVATION: CON-
TRASTING PERSPECTIVES 27 (David Weisburd & Anthony A. Braga eds., 2006), http://www.skogan.
org/files/Promise_of_Comm_Policing_2006.pdf [http://perma.cc/LFM6-BUYH]. 
 175 Id. (stating that community policing was about “changing decisionmaking processes and in-
creasing new cultures within police departments”). Scholars have had trouble defining this community 
policing movement. But at least one scholar has argued that this movement reversed some of the im-
portant trends of the professionalism movement. Sklansky, supra note 163, at 2. During this time, 
police departments no longer focused narrowly on crime suppression, but instead broadened their 
goals. Id. at 1. Departments started selecting these goals in consultation with the community. Id. at 1–
2. And in order to make this process more feasible, departments decentralized authority. Id. at 2. 
 176 A study in Chicago found that “after eight years of citywide community policing, Chicagoans’ 
views of their police improved by ten to fifteen percentage points on measures of their effectiveness, 
responsiveness, and demeanor.” Skogan, supra note 174, at 31. But Chicagoans felt these benefits of 
community policing unevenly. Communities of color were less likely to participate in community 
policing efforts in part because of a fear of retaliation for working with police. Id. 
 177 For example, a study in Houston found that white middle- and upper-class individuals reported 
satisfaction with community policing efforts. WESLEY G. SKOGAN ET AL., ON THE BEAT: POLICE AND 
COMMUNITY PROBLEM SOLVING 238 (1999), http://www.skogan.org/files/On_The_Beat_Police_
and_Community_Problem_Solving.pdf [http://perma.cc/G4Z8-8HMR]. 
 178 The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 dedicated billions of dollars to 
training local officers in community policing efforts. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (2012)); Skogan, supra note 174, at 40. By 1999, approx-
imately 88% of all new recruits and 85% of currently serving officers were trained in community 
policing. Skogan, supra note 174, at 40. 
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demands has led to a remarkable variation in policies and procedures from one 
jurisdiction to the next. In some cases, though, the tactics that a local agency 
develops to deal with its own jurisdictional problems systemically violate the 
rights of certain segments of the population. And because decentralized law 
enforcement agencies take their cues from local political leaders, these system-
ic abuses are sometimes not just tolerated, but are even encouraged. 
Maricopa County, Arizona provides an example. Joe Arpaio has been 
elected Sheriff of Maricopa County for six consecutive terms.179 Sheriff Arpaio 
has received international notoriety for his unconventional and legally ques-
tionable tactics.180 One of the issues that Sheriff Arpaio has emphasized heavily 
in recent years is the need for local law enforcement to help combat undocu-
mented immigration into the United States. But before 2005, Sheriff Arpaio 
admitted that he personally did not view undocumented immigration as a “seri-
ous legal issue.”181 It was not until the County Attorney of Maricopa County 
Andrew Thomas won a countywide election with the slogan “Stop Illegal Im-
migration” that Sheriff Arpaio’s office began emphasizing the need to crack 
down on undocumented immigrants.182 By all accounts, Sheriff Arpaio re-
sponded to local community demands and altered his enforcement of the law to 
account for these prerogatives. His efforts have resulted in serious and ongoing 
allegations of racial profiling and a systemic unwillingness to investigate 
crimes against undocumented immigrants.183 And even though around thirty 
percent of the population in Maricopa County is Latino,184 the majority of vot-
ers have continued to reelect Sheriff Arpaio, implicitly supporting his use of 
tactics that appear to disproportionately affect a significant minority group. 
The Maricopa County Sheriff’s Department is likely one of many. When 
police are primarily accountable to local political leaders and majoritarian pref-
erences, some agencies with particular demographic characteristics or local 
                                                                                                                           
 179 Phil Benson, Sheriff Joe Arpaio Sworn In for 6th Term, KPHO NEWS (Jan. 6, 2013), http://
www.kpho.com/story/20516330/sheriff-joe-arpaio-sworn-in-for-6th-term [http://perma.cc/G4S8-8CXN]. 
 180 See, e.g., Associated Press, DOJ to Question Arpaio in Civil Rights Lawsuit, CBS D.C. (Feb. 
7, 2014, 7:58 AM), http://washington.cbslocal.com/2014/02/07/doj-to-question-arpaio-in-civil-rights-
lawsuit/ [http://perma.cc/3LV8-T2LW]. 
 181 William Hermann & Edvard Pettersson, Arizona’s Arpaio Testifies Race Not Factor in Ar-
rests, BLOOMBERG NEWS (July 24, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-07-24/-america-s-
toughest-sheriff-to-answer-profiling-claims.html [http://perma.cc/Z6GJ-VL7K] (quoting Arpaio as 
saying that before 2005, he never viewed illegal immigration as a “serious legal issue”). 
 182 E.J. Montini, Still Doubting Thomas on Immigration?, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (July 18, 2010), http://
archive.azcentral.com/arizonarepublic/news/articles/2010/06/18/20100618Montini0618.html [http://
perma.cc/N42R-9J7F] (quoting Thomas and describing his use of this slogan and issue during his 
campaign). 
 183 E.g., Associated Press, supra note 180. 
 184 See State & County QuickFacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/
states/04/04013.html [perma.cc/BDU3-GXHH] (indicating that Maricopa County is 30.3% Hispanic 
or Latino). 
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challenges will support the use of police procedures that disproportionately 
burden local minorities.185 
3. Making Police Misconduct Routine 
The inherent characteristics of the American institution of policing mean 
that some wrongdoing will occur in every department. Further, given the de-
centralization of policing in the United States and the disparities between agen-
cies, some departments will have less incentive to fight this misconduct rigor-
ously. This lack of incentive is particularly important because policing scholars 
believe that the organizational response to misconduct is critical. Some police 
organizations facilitate systemic misconduct by making this kind of wrongdo-
ing routine. 
Misconduct becomes routine primarily through the development of an in-
ternal organizational culture that passively permits wrongdoing. This sort of 
culture often develops through a lack of oversight mechanisms and is rein-
forced through training, punishment, and rewards.186 Organizational research 
shows that socialization and on-the-job training can make rule violation rou-
tine.187 Organizational leadership also appears to be critically important to the 
presence of misconduct. Leaders can apply performance pressure that affects 
individual action and can support internal cultures that either indirectly or di-
rectly condone misconduct.188 
The Los Angeles Police Department (“LAPD”) serves as a useful example 
of an agency normalizing and routinizing misconduct.189 In the aftermath of the 
Rodney King events, the City of Los Angeles developed an independent com-
                                                                                                                           
 185 Of course, this problem sounds similar to constitutional dilemmas in other institutional con-
texts like voting, schooling, and housing. In these other contexts, the federal government has inter-
vened to protect these minority interests. In the context of policing though, the federal government has 
traditionally played a much less significant role in combating police wrongdoing. 
 186 See generally Vaughan, supra note 151 (describing how marginal or failing organizations are 
more likely to experience misconduct within their ranks). 
 187 See, e.g., MAURICE PUNCH, CONDUCT UNBECOMING 46 (1985) (explaining a corruption scan-
dal surrounding Amsterdam’s police in the late 1970s); Joseph Bensman & Israel Gerver, Crime and 
Punishment in the Factory: The Function of Deviancy in Maintaining the Social System, 28 AMER. 
SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 588, 595 (1963) (discussing how deviant behavior contributes and supports the 
system). 
 188 Vaughan, supra note 151, at 290 (showing how the “willingness [of an organizational mem-
ber] to use illegitimate means on the organization’s behalf is sealed by a reinforcing system of rewards 
and punishments”). 
 189 The Philadelphia Police Department appears to provide another example of this phenomenon. 
There, the DOJ had investigated six homicide detectives for coercing confessions out potentially inno-
cent suspects. But rather than punishing this behavior, the Philadelphia Police Department actually 
rewarded it. In fact, at least one of those convicted of coercing confessions out of criminal suspects 
received a promotion and public support from city leadership. BONNIE MATHEWS & GLORIA IZUMI, 
U. S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, WHO IS GUARDING THE GUARDIANS?: A REPORT ON POLICE PRAC-
TICES 79 (1981), http://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/007105152 [http://perma.cc/DD7G-KTCC]. 
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mission to investigate the conditions that precipitated the incident, headed by 
Warren Christopher.190 The report filed by this commission came to be infor-
mally known as the Christopher Commission Report.  
The Christopher Commission Report found a wide range of systemic 
problems affecting the LAPD, including problems with use of force, complaint 
procedures, training policies, and structural organization. The Commission 
found a startling pattern of excessive use of force amongst a small portion of 
officers.191 The Christopher Commission Report also determined the LAPD 
used insufficient complaint procedures and improper investigations in cases 
where citizens levied complaints.192 Once more, the Commission determined 
that internal policies and procedures used by the Internal Affairs Division make 
it hard for citizens to file complaints.  
For example, the report noted that “[s]ome intake officers actively dis-
courage filing by being uncooperative or requiring long waits before complet-
ing a complaint form.”193 The Christopher Commission Report also concluded 
that the LAPD’s training programs were unsatisfactory.194 The Commission 
believed that the agency-wide misconduct could be traced back to training pro-
                                                                                                                           
 190 See Rushin, Structural Reform Litigation, supra note 20, at 1345 n.3 (describing the formation 
of what came to be known as the Christopher Commission). 
 191 Although the vast majority of LAPD officers had only one to two allegations of excessive 
force, around “183 officers had four or more allegations, 44 had six or more, 16 had eight or more, 
and one had 16 such allegations.” CHRISTOPHER COMM’N REPORT, supra note 116, at ix–x. Similarly, 
of the 6000 police officers involved in use of force incidents between January 1987 and March 1991, 
“more than 4000 had fewer than five reports each.” Id. at x. Again the overwhelming majority of all 
officers had fewer than five reported uses of force. Id. (explaining that “63 officers had 20 or more 
reports each” and “[t]he top 5% of the officers [ranked by number of reports] accounted for more than 
20% of all reports”). But a small cohort of officers accounted for a large amount of all use of force 
reports. Id. Among the officers that were subject to the most allegations of excessive use of force, “the 
performance evaluation reports . . . were very positive,” as they “document[ed] every complimentary 
comment received” and were “uniformly optimistic about the officer’s progress and prospects on the 
force.” Id. at 41. 
 192 The Commission reviewed “83 civil lawsuits alleging excessive or improper force by LAPD 
officers for the period 1986 through 1990 that resulted in a settlement or judgment of more than 
$15,000.” Id. at xi. This review showed that the majority of “cases involved clear and often egregious 
misconduct resulting in serious injury or death to the victim.” Id. Of particular note, the Commission 
found that the LAPD’s internal investigation into the events surrounding these eighty-three lawsuits 
were regularly “light or non-existent.” Id. The Commission also found that the LAPD’s internal pro-
cedures for handling citizen complaints frequently led to public frustration. Out of 2152 citizen allega-
tions of excessive force, the LAPD only sustained forty-two. Id. at xix. This means that the LAPD 
sustained roughly 1–2% of all citizen complaints for excessive use of force. This was in part because 
the division of the police department responsible for investigating these claims—the Internal Affairs 
Division—had limited resources. Id. 
 193 Id. 
 194 As the report explained, LAPD officers went through three different training phases. Id. at xvi. 
Officers received their initial training at the police academy. Id. After this, officers then went through 
a probationary period for one year when they worked in the field with more experienced officers. Id. 
After this, officers received continuing in-service training. Id. 
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grams that emphasized the use of physical force as opposed to verbal skills.195 
And the Commission noted several other systemic problems, including star-
tling cases of documented racism.196 The Commission cited several specific 
examples of racist behaviors by LAPD officers, such as officers referring to 
interactions with minority residents as “monkey slapping time” and making 
other highly offensive comments.197 Shortly before the King beating, in fact, 
one of the officers involved compared a domestic dispute between two African-
American individuals to “gorillas in the mist” over the radio.198 More disturb-
ingly, evidence suggests that leadership within the police department heard or 
knew of these kinds of statements, but did nothing to stop them or punish those 
involved.199 
The LAPD during this time bore all of the hallmarks of a problematic po-
lice organization: a lack of internal accountability measures, supervisors that 
did not punish obvious misconduct, and leadership that either implicitly or ex-
plicitly approved of wrongdoing. This made misconduct normal within the or-
ganization. External punishment of individual officers—the most common fed-
eral response to police wrongdoing during the twentieth century—merely ad-
dressed isolated symptoms. Such a historical approach could not treat the un-
derlying illness. 
4. The Cost of Reform and Other Barriers 
A couple of other barriers further discourage police departments from 
proactively responding to misconduct within their ranks. First, the cost of po-
lice reform is often prohibitive. When the DOJ has sought to overhaul prob-
lematic police departments, it has commonly required the agencies to pay for 
the implementation of early warning systems, new training procedures, new 
complaint management systems, use of force policies, and external monitor-
ing.200 Take the LAPD as an example again. There, the DOJ used § 14141 to 
investigate and eventually reform the LAPD between 2001 and 2013. During 
this time, the LAPD paid more than $100 million to cover the cost of DOJ-
mandated reforms.201 Similar settlements in New Orleans202 and Cleveland203 
                                                                                                                           
 195 De-escalation, they argued, should be an important component of training at every stage. Id. at 
xix. The Commission also found that training did not emphasize culture respect and awareness 
enough. Id. Additionally, the Commission found that the requirements for training officers were insuf-
ficient. Id. at xvii. 
 196 Id. at xii. 
 197 Id. 
 198 Id. at 14. 
 199 Id. at xii–xiii. 
 200 Rushin, Structural Reform Litigation, supra note 20, at 1378–87 (discussing the reforms man-
dated by the DOJ in previous § 14141 settlements). 
 201 Id. at 1393 (“[I]n Los Angeles, the cost of implementing reforms likely totaled around $80–90 
million.
 
When factoring in the cost of hiring the external monitor in Los Angeles, which came in at 
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are expected to cost anywhere between $50–$60 million. It is an inconvenient 
but undeniable fact that correcting misconduct in police departments is expen-
sive. Additionally, municipalities are often unwilling to allocate scarce re-
sources to the cause of police reform, when doing so means taking resources 
away from other local needs. 
Second, collective bargaining and civil service protections inadvertently 
discourage police management from responding forcefully to misconduct. As 
one scholar observed, “thirty-four states require government employers to en-
gage in collective bargaining with public-sector employees, and another nine 
states permit, but not require, public-sector collective bargaining.”204 Under 
collective bargaining agreements, police unions have the ability to negotiate 
with police management on a range of topics, including the procedures that 
management must follow when investigating and disciplining officers that have 
engaged in misconduct.205 “[T]he grievance procedures that are often a central 
part of collective bargaining agreements both discourage and frustrate attempts 
to discipline individual officers.”206 Even in jurisdictions that do not have col-
lective bargaining agreements, state civil service laws make it procedurally 
demanding to punish problematic officers.207 As a result, when management 
wants to implement a reform mechanism designed to root our misconduct, it 
must often navigate the complex and challenging legal process to do so. Col-
                                                                                                                           
around $2 million a year,
 
the Los Angeles price tag likely surpassed $100 million.” (footnotes omit-
ted)). 
 202 Jaquetta White, City’s 2015 Budget Includes $7.3 Million for NOPD Consent Decree, ADVO-
CATE (BATON ROUGE) (Nov. 4, 2014), http://theadvocate.com/news/neworleans/10689951-148/citys-
2015-budget-includes-73 [http://perma.cc/9S7B-JQAD] (stating that this cost will cover more officers, 
new hardware, and a comprehensive early warning system). 
 203 Rich Exner, How Much Cleveland Will Pay to Reform Its Police Department Under Consent 
Decree, CLEVELAND.COM (June 2, 2015), http://www.cleveland.com/datacentral/index.ssf/2015/
06/how_much_it_will_cost_clevelan.html [http://perma.cc/4BSA-6679] (attributing these costs to the 
added expense of external monitoring, training, hardware, additional staffing, and more). 
 204 Seth W. Stoughton, The Incidental Regulation of Policing, 98 MINN. L. REV. 2179, 2207 
(2014). Police are also “relative newcomers to the labor movement.” Id. at 2206. But today, police 
unions are common. And it is frequently the case that police departments have more than one union 
representing the officers of that department. Id. at 2208 (describing how the Dallas Police Department 
has both chapters of the Fraternal Order of Police and the Dallas Police Association). 
 205 Id. at 2212 (using examples from Illinois, Ohio, and Florida). 
 206 Id. at 2211–12 (“An officer’s ability to contest adverse employment actions makes supervisors 
less likely to impose disciplinary sanctions because while a supervisor faces a possible headache for 
not disciplining a misbehaving subordinate, they face a certain headache if they do.”). 
 207 Id. at 2212. As one scholar explained, 
[I]n the civil service context, an officer who is left alone after having violated a policy 
or procedure may commit a future infraction, which may injure someone, who may file 
a complaint or may find a lawyer to file a lawsuit, all of which may have an effect on 
the supervisor, but an officer who is reprimanded, transferred, suspended, or terminated 
is both enabled and highly motivated to challenge the disciplinary action. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
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lective bargaining and civil service laws incidentally interfere with efforts to 
combat police reform. They serve as a sort of “tax” on efforts to protect civil 
rights.208 
Given these barriers to locally supported police reform, we should not ex-
pect data transparency to stimulate bottom-up reform in all police departments. 
Top-down reform, initiated by the federal government, may be necessary to 
bring about reform in some police departments. There are simply too many 
political and structural barriers that prevent some police departments from pro-
actively addressing corruption within their ranks without additional federal 
incentives. The federal government took the first step in this direction by pass-
ing § 14141 over twenty years ago. Although § 14141 has helped reform a 
handful of major police departments, it has ultimately failed to live up to its 
promise as a transformative tool for federal oversight of local police depart-
ments. By using DCRA, FBI, and BJS data on police violence, the next Part 
argues that the DOJ can improve enforcement of § 14141. 
III. USING DATA ON POLICE VIOLENCE TO FACILITATE FEDERAL 
INTERVENTION INTO LOCAL POLICE DEPARTMENTS 
None of the planned DCRA, FBI, or BJS databases on police violence 
constitute Congress’s first attempt at establishing meaningful federal oversight 
of local police departments.209 In 1991, the American public was reeling from 
the release of the Rodney King footage.210 Much like today with the deaths of 
Michael Brown, Tamir Rice, and Eric Garner, the Rodney King video sparked 
a national conversation about the federal government’s role in combating po-
lice brutality.211 The federal government needed a weapon to prevent problem-
atic police departments like the LAPD from systemically violating civil rights.  
                                                                                                                           
 208 Rachel A. Harmon, The Problem of Policing, 110 MICH. L. REV. 761, 811 (2012). 
 209 Death in Custody Reporting Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-242, 128 Stat. 2860 (2014) (to be 
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 13727); see also supra notes 8–14 and accompanying text (describing the 
planned FBI and BJS databases). 
 210 Harmon, supra note 32, at 12 n.31. Professor Harmon described the incident: 
On March 2, 1991, Los Angeles Police Department officers attempted to subdue Rod-
ney King, an African-American man, after a high-speed chase. King initially resisted 
arrest, and officers fired a taser at him and struck him with batons in order to subdue 
him. As a videotape of the incident famously portrayed, officers continued to stomp on 
King, kick him, and strike him with baton blows even after he lay prone on the ground. 
Id. 
 211 Rushin, Federal Enforcement of Police Reform, supra note 20, at 3207 (“This event almost 
immediately spurred congressional investigation into the scope of police misconduct problems in the 
United States. Within weeks of the event, the House Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights 
convened to consider . . . how the federal government could do more to address brutality among the 
ranks of local police.”). 
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The obvious answer appeared to be the use of equitable relief to force po-
lice departments to make policy and procedural changes, also known as struc-
tural reform litigation. For decades, the federal government and private liti-
gants had both successfully used structural reform litigation to bring about re-
form in other institutional contexts like prisons and schools.212 But federal 
courts have held that both private litigants and the federal government general-
ly lack standing to seek equitable relief against police departments absent ex-
plicit congressional authorization.213 So in 1994 Congress addressed this prob-
lem by passing 42 U.S.C. § 14141.214 Section 14141 gives the U.S. Attorney 
General the necessary standing to seek equitable relief against local police de-
partments engaged in a pattern or practice of unconstitutional misconduct.215 
Scholars hailed § 14141 as a major victory for civil rights in the United 
States.216 Finally, it appeared that Congress had empowered the federal gov-
ernment with the authority to force local police departments to make specific 
policy and procedural changes aimed at curbing misconduct. 
A. The Challenges Facing § 14141 Enforcement 
While the DOJ has used § 14141 to improve a number of police depart-
ments across the country,217 there has been a growing frustration with § 14141 
as a regulatory mechanism, as detailed below.218  
                                                                                                                           
 212 Gilles, supra note 22, at 1390 (explaining how federal courts have agreed to enact structural 
reforms via litigation in schools and prisons). 
 213 In 1983, in City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, the U.S. Supreme Court considered an individual’s 
lawsuit against the LAPD, alleging that an officer used a dangerous chokehold. 461 U.S. 95, 97–98 
(1983). The individual also sought to enjoin the LAPD from using this chokehold in the future. Id. at 
95–100. The Court held that the private litigant did not have the requisite standing to enjoin the LAPD 
from using this dangerous chokehold because he could not prove a continuing or future threat from the 
tactic. Id. at 102–05. Because of the Lyons precedent, private litigants rarely have the requisite stand-
ing to initiate structural reform litigation (“SRL”) against police departments. Gilles, supra note 22, at 
1386 (“In the aftermath of Lyons, meaningful enforcement of [civil] rights . . . —at least so far as 
injunctive relief is concerned—[was] left solely to the government.”). Similarly in 1980, in United 
States v. City of Philadelphia, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the DOJ did 
not have standing to enjoin the Philadelphia Police Department from using certain tactics, absent ex-
plicit congressional authorization. 644 F.2d 187, 206 (3d Cir. 1980). 
 214 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 210401, 
108 Stat. 1796, 2071 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (2012)). 
 215 42 U.S.C. § 14141(b) (“Whenever the Attorney General has reasonable cause to believe [that 
there is a pattern or practice of misconduct in a local police department] . . . the Attorney General . . . 
may in a civil action obtain appropriate equitable and declaratory relief to eliminate the pattern or 
practice.”). 
 216 See, e.g., Stuntz, supra note 21, at 539 n.134 (arguing that § 14141 may have an even greater 
effect than the exclusionary rule). 
 217 See, e.g., Simmons, supra note 22, at 531 (citing Cincinnati as an example of a successful 
collaborative reform process initiated by the DOJ). 
 218 See Brandon Garrett, Remedying Racial Profiling, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 41, 100–01 
(2001) (claiming that “the DOJ lacks the resources” to address some problem facing police depart-
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1. Challenges in Identifying Problematic Police Departments 
Since passage of § 14141, the DOJ has struggled to develop a coherent 
methodology to identify police departments engaged in systemic misconduct. 
How, after all, “should a small team of lawyers in Washington, D.C.” go about 
identifying which local and state police agencies are engaged in a pattern or 
practice of unconstitutional wrongdoing?219 The text of § 14141 provides the 
DOJ with no guidance. DOJ officials claimed that they have used media cover-
age,220 existing civil litigation,221 internal whistleblowers,222 and academic 
studies223 to identify problematic police departments. Ultimately, as one DOJ 
insider explained, “There is no simple formula for identifying problematic po-
lice departments.”224 These findings reinforce the suspicions of at least one 
scholar who has argued that “it doesn’t seem like [Justice Department officials] 
have a very strategic approach—they simply react to cases brought to them.”225 
Without the benefit of any national statistics on police brutality, the DOJ has no 
consistent way to compare the behavior of one police department to another. The 
result is that the DOJ’s case selection process appears sloppy to outsiders.226  
                                                                                                                           
ments like racial profiling as demonstrated by the “[f]ew consent decrees”); Gilles, supra note 22, at 
1407–11 (claiming that resource and political constraints prevent the DOJ from bringing about more 
claims under § 14141); Jeffries & Rutherglen, supra note 22, at 1419 (stating that “the Department of 
Justice faces financial and political constraints on its effectiveness” in enforcing § 14141); Rushin, 
Federal Enforcement of Police Reform, supra note 20, at 3192 (“But in recent years, enthusiasm for 
the legislation has waned, in part because of a prevailing belief that the DOJ has not effectively used 
structural police reform.”). 
 219 Rushin, Structural Reform Litigation, supra note 20, at 1367. 
 220 See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Department of Justice Participant No. 12, at 3–4 (July 30, 
2013) [hereinafter Interview No. 12] (transcript on file with author); Telephone Interview with De-
partment of Justice Participant No. 14, at 4 (July 11, 2013) [hereinafter Interview No. 14] (transcript 
on file with author) (“Occasionally [inquiries] get started when there is a big expos[é] of a big prob-
lem in a department . . . .”); Telephone Interview with Department of Justice Participant No. 18, at 4 
(Aug. 8, 2013) (transcript on file with author) (stating that the DOJ identified cases “through a mix of 
media reviews [and] newspaper reviews”); Telephone Interview with External Monitor No. 13, at 5 
(Aug. 5, 2013) (transcript on file with author). 
 221 Interview No. 14, supra note 220, at 4 (talking about how the DOJ intervened in Steubenville 
because of a series of civil cases brought by attorney James McNamara). 
 222 Interview No. 12, supra note 220, at 2 (“[S]ometimes there were internal whistle blowers.” 
(alteration in original)). 
 223 Rushin, Federal Enforcement of Police Reform, supra note 20, at 3222 (using a study by John 
Lamberth as an example of such a study that directed DOJ action at the New Jersey State Police De-
partment). 
 224 Rushin, Structural Reform Litigation, supra note 20, at 1369 (quoting Interview No. 14, supra 
note 220, at 4). 
 225 Lichtblau, supra note 22 (quoting Professor Michael Selmi). 
 226 Rushin, Structural Reform Litigation, supra note 20, at 3194. 
2016] Using Data to Reduce Police Violence 157 
2. Lack of Resources 
The DOJ also lacks the necessary resources to enforce § 14141 effective-
ly.227 Between 1994 and 2012, the DOJ investigated around fifty-five police 
departments in the United States pursuant to § 14141.228 The DOJ has only had 
the resources to pursue § 14141 investigations against less than 0.02% of the 
nation’s law enforcement agencies each year.229 Further, the DOJ only reached 
a negotiated settlement pursuant to § 14141 with around twenty-two agencies 
during this time—or a little more than one per calendar year.230 In explaining 
the relatively small number of § 14141 cases each year, a DOJ insider stated, 
“[T]here’s no way that the [DOJ] can litigate all of the patterns and practices of 
police misconduct in this country. There are too many policing jurisdictions . . . 
to do that.”231 Even if a pattern of misconduct exists in one out of every one 
hundred law enforcement agencies, “[T]he DOJ [still] only has the resources to 
investigate less than 2 percent of these departments each year.”232 This lack of 
regular enforcement may limit the ability of § 14141 to deter misconduct. If 
agencies view § 14141 action to be a remote possibility, rational choice theory 
suggests that they will have little reason to reform.233 This reality has led some 
scholars to call for more resources to enforce § 14141, or for a new enforce-
ment approach that will promote proactive reform by police departments. 
3. Lack of Transparency 
Another problem with § 14141 enforcement has been a perceived lack of 
transparency. This problem has led to two unfortunate results. First, many cities 
feel “unfairly targeted.”234 This feeling is perhaps best illustrated by the re-
sponse of the former City Manager of Steubenville, Ohio. After his police de-
                                                                                                                           
 227 Harmon, supra note 32, at 21 (stating this view “attribute[s] the weakness of § 14141 en-
forcement to insufficient resources devoted to structural reform of police departments and the related 
absence of political commitment to § 14141 suits, especially on the part of the Bush Administration”). 
 228 Rushin, Federal Enforcement of Police Reform, supra note 20, app. A (showing the full list of 
all formal investigations pursued by the DOJ between 1994 and 2012). 
 229 Id. at 3230. 
 230 Id. app. B (showing the name of each police department to agree to a settlement with the DOJ 
along with the dates). 
 231 Interview No. 14, supra note 220, at 11. 
 232 Rushin, Federal Enforcement of Police Reform, supra note 20, at 3230. 
 233 Harmon, supra note 32, at 22–23. As Professor Harmon explained,  
According to deterrence theory, a rational actor will engage in conduct when doing so 
provides a positive expected return in light of the actor’s utility function. Thus, a police 
department will adopt remedial measures to prevent misconduct when doing so is a 
cost-effective means of reducing the net costs of police misconduct or increasing the net 
benefits of protecting civil rights. 
Id. 
 234 Rushin, Federal Enforcement of Police Reform, supra note 20, at 3219. 
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partment was selected for § 14141 reform, he remarked, “We’re an awfully 
small community. You see all these problems that have come up at the police 
departments in Los Angeles and New York and New Orleans, and you’ve got to 
wonder, why us?”235 This perceived procedural unfairness could hinder the re-
form process.  
This lack of transparency on the part of the DOJ also contributes to a sec-
ond problem. Police departments seem less likely to reform proactively without 
a clear understanding of how the DOJ is identifying problematic police de-
partments. The DOJ has thus far used § 14141 to compel merely a handful of 
police departments to make specific reforms.236 But without a clear case selec-
tion process, the DOJ has been unable to induce other police departments to 
adopt reforms preemptively.237 One scholar, thus, has argued that the DOJ 
ought to create a transparent case selection process that gives notice to police 
departments and also creates incentives for police departments that take proac-
tive steps to address systemic wrongdoing within their ranks.238 
4. Sustainability 
Concerns also exist about the sustainability of § 14141 reforms. The typi-
cal § 14141 reform process can take anywhere from five to ten years or longer 
to complete.239 During this time, an external monitor oversees the implementa-
tion of DOJ-mandated reforms and files quarterly reports detailing the police 
department’s progress.240 But invariably, the DOJ monitoring must end. The 
hope is that the DOJ reforms will stick long after the external monitoring ends. 
Recent evidence, though, suggests that some of the reforms implemented by 
the DOJ may unravel soon after the external monitoring ends.241 This situation 
raises an important and unanswered question: How can the DOJ keep tabs on 
police departments that have already undergone § 14141 reform? In the ab-
                                                                                                                           
 235 Lichtblau, supra note 22 (quoting the City Manager). 
 236 Harmon, supra note 32, at 4. 
 237 Cf. id. (proposing “a new approach to § 14141 enforcement, one that overcomes the limits of 
direct reform by inducing departmental reform as well as compelling it” (emphasis added)). 
 238 See generally id. (describing how the DOJ should (1) prioritize litigation against the worst 
large police departments, (2) develop a list of the worst police departments that is publicly displayed 
in order to induce reform, and (3) give departments a safe harbor if they make proactive changes after 
being included on this list of the worst police departments). 
 239 Rushin, Structural Reform Litigation, supra note 20, at 1392 fig.5 (showing the length of time 
it has taken for each police department to complete monitored reform, ranging from five years for 
Cincinnati and Prince George’s County to 11.9 years in Los Angeles). 
 240 Id. at 1393 (“During this reform process, the external monitor regularly visits the police agen-
cy to audit departmental records and meet with officers.”). 
 241 Id. at 1410–11 (explaining how many of the reforms implemented by Robert McNeilly in 
Pittsburgh under the DOJ consent decree appear to have unraveled once he was fired by Mayor Robert 
O’Connor Jr.). 
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sence of useful national statistics on police behavior, the DOJ has lacked the 
resources to ensure the sustainability of § 14141 reforms. 
All of this is not to say that § 14141 is wholly ineffective. In fact, § 14141 
has often proven to be a powerful weapon for reform, in the LAPD and a num-
ber of other police departments.242 The author of this Article has argued that 
§ 14141 forces police departments to prioritize investments in police reform.243 
It often instigates change in departmental leadership.244 The use of mandatory 
external monitoring ensures that police departments substantively comply with 
the terms of negotiated settlements.245 And § 14141 settlements can provide 
supportive leadership in a police department with the necessary legal cover to 
justify necessary reforms that may be unpopular with organized labor.246 Con-
sequently, the DOJ has used § 14141 to bring about meaningful reform in not 
just Los Angeles, but also in Washington, D.C., Cincinnati, and Detroit.247 Re-
forms are also currently underway in other large cities, including New Orleans 
and Seattle.248 But the effectiveness of § 14141 has been somewhat limited by 
the lack of national statistics on local police departments. In this sense, while 
highly imperfect, the DCRA, FBI, and BJS data may incrementally improve 
the enforcement of § 14141.  
B. Using DCRA, FBI, and BJS Data on Police Violence to  
Improve § 14141 Enforcement 
The forthcoming data on police violence represent opportunities for the 
DOJ to improve the enforcement of § 14141. The core problem facing § 14141 
has been a lack of information on police behavior. Without adequate infor-
mation, the federal government cannot use the statute to engage in widespread 
oversight of local police departments. This Article does not argue that these 
new databases will fix all of the problems facing § 14141. The DCRA, FBI, 
and BJS databases will only provide the DOJ with potentially useful infor-
                                                                                                                           
 242 Id. at 1421 (“SRL provides the federal government with a unique opportunity to force local 
police agencies to adopt invasive and costly reforms aimed at curbing misconduct.”). 
 243 Id. at 1397–400 (using Los Angeles as an example of a police department that appeared un-
willing to make significant investments into police reform efforts until the DOJ applied pressure via 
§ 14141, resulting in approximately $100 million in additional funding thereafter). 
 244 Id. at 1400–01 (using changes in leadership in Seattle, New Orleans, Los Angeles, and Pitts-
burgh as examples of this phenomenon). 
 245 Id. at 1401–04 (again using Los Angeles as an example of a police department that benefited 
tremendously from the use of external monitoring, including auditing to ensure compliance with con-
stitutional norms). 
 246 Id. at 1376 (“[P]olice unions commonly attempt to intervene in settlement negotiations with 
the intent of blocking reforms that may increase oversight or otherwise burden frontline police offic-
ers.”). 
 247 Id. at 1378 fig.3 (showing a full map of the police departments that have undergone § 14141 
investigations and reforms). 
 248 Id. at 1347. 
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mation on one facet of police behavior. Congress passed § 14141 with the 
hopes of enjoining all sorts of police misconduct, from unlawful killings, to 
excessive Terry stops, to racial profiling.249 In a perfect world, Congress would 
give the DOJ accurate national statistics on all local police behavior. 
But we do not live in a perfect world. The DCRA, FBI, and BJS datasets 
will ultimately represent some of the only national sources on potentially sus-
pect police behavior. Remember that it is impossible to have accurate national 
statistics on many aspects of police behavior because policing, by its very na-
ture, is highly discretionary and unstructured.250 American policing is also ex-
traordinarily decentralized across thousands of individual, largely autonomous 
departments.251 Given these challenges, these new datasets represent something 
imperfect but useful—comprehensive databases documenting the most deadly 
police behavior that should prove difficult for police departments to manipulate 
and easy for third parties to authenticate.252 And perhaps most importantly, an 
excessive number of police killings often serves as a symptom of larger organi-
zational deficiencies. Thus, the DOJ could use these databases to improve the 
enforcement of § 14141 in three ways set out below. 
1. Identifying Police Departments Engaged in Misconduct 
The DOJ could use these new databases to identify police departments 
that are engaged in a pattern or practice of unconstitutional misconduct. Re-
member that, in the absence of national statistics on police behavior, the DOJ 
has been forced to use a range of highly imperfect methods to identify police 
agencies are in violation of § 14141.253 The current case selection methods 
generally require the DOJ to operate reactively—the DOJ essentially relies on 
third parties like the media to collect evidence of misconduct.254 The DOJ then 
                                                                                                                           
 249 See H.R. REP. NO. 102-242, at 136–38 (1991) (discussing the congressional intent underlying 
§ 14141). 
 250 See supra notes 98–117 and accompanying text (describing the use of discretion in policing). 
 251 See supra notes 118–185 and accompanying text (explaining the causes and consequences of 
decentralization). 
 252 See supra notes 36–73 and accompanying text (discussing why the new datasets will be useful 
albeit imperfect). 
 253 See supra notes 219–226 and accompanying text (describing the trouble the DOJ has had in 
identifying police departments in violation of § 14141); see also Rushin, Federal Enforcement of 
Police Reform, supra note 20, at 3220–24 (citing various examples of the different case selection 
methodologies that the DOJ currently uses, including media coverage, civil litigation, whistleblowers, 
and academic studies). 
 254 See supra notes 219–238 and accompanying text (describing the DOJ’s methods of identifying 
cases for § 14141 reforms); see also Rushin, Federal Enforcement of Police Reform, supra note 20, at 
3219–24 (describing the manner by which the DOJ current enforces § 14141). 
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surveys these third-party sources to uncover potential targets for preliminary 
inquiries.255 
This process undoubtedly helps the DOJ identify at least some of the po-
lice departments that are engaged in systemic misconduct. But this case selec-
tion process does not allow for the DOJ to make meaningful, cross-
departmental comparisons. For example, the DOJ commonly relies on media 
reports of misconduct to guide § 14141 enforcement.256 As the last few years 
have demonstrated, some incidents of police misconduct receive prominent 
media attention, while others seem to go unnoticed. This inconsistency only 
adds to the seemingly arbitrary nature of the DOJ’s current case selection 
methods. Thus, one advantage of using statistics on police killings to guide 
§ 14141 enforcement is that they give the DOJ a uniform metric to identify po-
tentially problematic police departments. It would also make cross-departmental 
comparisons more effective. 
Some critics may claim that the DOJ should not base its § 14141 en-
forcement strategy exclusively on the number and circumstances of civilian 
deaths at the hands of law enforcement. No doubt, some police departments 
may be engaged in a pattern of racial profiling or unlawful searches that repre-
sent a clear violation of § 14141, but do not result in any civilian deaths. Thus, 
one possible criticism of this enforcement strategy is that it will do little to ad-
dress police misconduct that does not result in a death. This concern is a fair 
one. This Article does not suggest that the DOJ should exclusively use DCRA, 
FBI, and BJS data in selecting police departments for § 14141 reform. The 
DOJ could use this emerging data on violence by police to ground some inves-
tigations while also leaving room for other case selection methods to identify 
other types of misconduct.  
But using national data on civilians killed by law enforcement to guide 
some § 14141 enforcement actions can clearly save lives. Albuquerque, New 
Mexico provides an example. The DOJ did not start investigating the Albu-
querque Police Department (“APD”) until November of 2012.257 Without na-
tional statistics on police killings, the DOJ was forced to act responsively ra-
ther than proactively to the police killings in Albuquerque. The subsequent 
DOJ investigation found that the APD had shot and killed twenty individuals in 
the preceding three years.258 Had the DOJ identified the unusually large num-
ber of police killings in the APD earlier via a national database, it could have 
                                                                                                                           
 255 Rushin, Federal Enforcement of Police Reform, supra note 20, at 3219–24. Given the limita-
tions the DOJ faces in enforcing § 14141, this sort of an enforcement approach makes sense. 
 256 Id. at 3220–22 (using the cases in Los Angeles, Cincinnati, and Washington, D.C. as examples 
of how media attention has helped the DOJ identify problematic patterns of police misconduct). 
 257 Id. app. A (showing that the investigation of the APD officially began on November 27, 
2012). 
 258 Albuquerque Investigative Finds Letter from DOJ, supra note 28, at 2–3. 
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potentially initiated an investigation earlier. Further investigation in the APD 
found that “a majority of these shootings were unconstitutional.”259 The large 
number of police killings was a symptom of an even larger problem in the 
APD. The DOJ investigation found that APD officers also “use[d] less lethal 
force in an unconstitutional manner,” and that a significant amount of use of 
force incidents involved “persons with mental illness and in crisis.”260 Thus in 
the APD, as in many police departments, an unusually high amount of police 
killings was evidence of broader misconduct within a police department 
Of course, data from the DCRA, FBI, and BJS will not be perfect. Even 
so, they should combine to represent a helpful tool for identifying police de-
partments engaged in high rates of violence against civilians.261 And if the fed-
eral government makes all of this data publicly available, the DOJ will have 
another tool to use in identifying problematic police departments. 
2. Publicizing Problematic Police Departments to Promote Proactive 
Reform 
The DOJ could also use the DCRA, FBI, and BJS data to stimulate wide-
spread and proactive reform in local police departments. Recall that the DOJ 
has only been able to investigate an average of around three law enforcement 
agencies police department each year—or less than 0.02% of the nation’s po-
lice departments.262 Section 14141 action is extremely rare, leading some to 
feel that the process lacks procedural fairness.263 The goal, then, for the DOJ is 
to establish, with limited resources, an enforcement strategy that appears pro-
cedurally fair, while also ensuring widespread compliance. This task has been 
virtually impossible without some national statistics on police behavior. 
To help accomplish these goals, the DOJ could use these new databases to 
create a national list of police departments that kill the most civilians per capi-
ta—similar to a creative proposal made by one scholar several years ago.264 
The DOJ could then publish this list of “Police Departments Responsible for 
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 260 Id. at 3. 
 261 See supra notes 75–93 and accompanying text (discussing how DCRA, FBI, and BJS data can 
help identify problematic police departments). 
 262 Rushin, Federal Enforcement of Police Reform, supra note 20, at 3230. Of course, this current 
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list of the most problematic police departments as a way to stimulate widespread change). 
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the Most Civilian Deaths” annually. The DOJ could then issue an ultimatum 
that gives the highest ranking police departments two choices—either (1) ex-
plain the unusually large number of killings by your officers, or (2) provide 
evidence that your department has taken steps to address these problems in the 
next year. The DOJ could then turn to § 14141 to enforce this ultimatum by 
prioritizing § 14141 investigations against police departments that fail to either 
justify or correct their pattern of civilian deaths. Similarly, the DOJ could offer 
safe harbor to police departments that proactively explain or correct their pat-
tern of police killings. The DOJ might even consider offering police depart-
ments a specific list of policies and procedures they must implement to obtain 
such safe harbor protection.265 
This approach would have two likely benefits. First, it would improve the 
perceived fairness of the § 14141 selection process. Unlike the current system, 
this proposed case selection process methodology would be more transparent. 
Municipalities would also have ample, public opportunity to respond to their 
ranking on the DOJ’s watch list. Second, and perhaps most importantly, this 
enforcement approach could motivate a larger number of police departments to 
adopt reforms on their own, despite the DOJ’s limited investigatory re-
sources.266 As it currently stands, the DOJ is careful not to publicly suggest a 
police department may be engaged in any misconduct before the formal inves-
tigation stage in § 14141 cases.267 The stated reasoning for this policy is that 
the DOJ does not want to unfairly implicate a police department that may not 
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be engaged in wrongdoing.268 This rationale is understandable. The DOJ does 
not want to unfairly suggest that a police department is engaged in systemic 
misconduct without first conducting a thorough investigation. But this caution 
also severely limits the national impact of § 14141. 
By publishing a list of “Police Departments Responsible for the Most Ci-
vilian Deaths” the DOJ can substantially increase the perceived risk of § 14141 
action. A hypothetical illustrates this point. Assume the City Council and Po-
lice Chief in the fictional City of Pleasantville are trying to decide whether they 
should fund additional police misconduct reforms to prevent DOJ intervention 
via § 14141. Under the current enforcement approach, Pleasantville would 
have little motivation to undertake reforms. As one scholar has previously ar-
gued,  
The expected cost of § 14141, E, to any municipality is at least p, 
the probability perceived by the municipality that its police depart-
ment will be subject to a full investigation under § 14141 (regardless 
of the outcome) multiplied by c, the cost a municipality expects to 
incur as a result of that investigation.269  
Given that the DOJ only has the resources to investigate around three munici-
palities per year, the probability (p) that the DOJ would target Pleasantville 
appears to be around 0.02%.270 Even if assuming that the ultimate cost (c) of 
§ 14141 reform in Pleasantville could run as high as $50 million—as it has in 
many other communities—the risk of § 14141 reforms may still be too remote 
for Pleasantville to justify such any significant police reform expenditure. Un-
der such circumstances, the expected cost (E) of § 14141 amounts to no more 
than $10,000—or the probability of § 14141 action (0.02%) multiplied by the 
possible cost of this DOJ action ($50 million). And that assumes that an inves-
tigation of Pleasantville would result in full-scale § 14141 reforms. 
Now assume that the DOJ were to adopt the enforcement strategy pro-
posed in this Article. Assume the DOJ identified twenty police departments on 
its annual “Police Departments Responsible for the Most Civilian Deaths” us-
                                                                                                                           
 268 Id. at 3225 n.253. As a knowledgeable DOJ insider stated, 
Opening an investigation is a huge deal. It’s a very big moment. You wouldn’t want to 
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ing DCRA, FBI, and BJS data. And assume that the DOJ announced that it 
would formally investigate and pursue § 14141 reform in three of these de-
partments each year. If Pleasantville were included on this list of “Police De-
partments Responsible for the Most Civilian Deaths,” city officials would be 
highly motivated to take proactive steps to avoid DOJ intervention. Rather than 
a 0.02% probability (p) of DOJ intervention, Pleasantville is now facing a 15% 
chance of a DOJ investigation.271 Given this probability of DOJ action, and the 
possible price tag associated with this intervention, Pleasantville may rationally 
conclude that it makes sense to allocate significant resources to proactive po-
lice reform. Using a deterrence theory formula, we can expect Pleasantville to 
invest up to $7.5 million to implement misconduct reforms after being included 
on a list of “Police Departments Responsible for the Most Civilian Deaths”—
that is, the probability of § 14141 action (15%) multiplied by the possible cost 
of this DOJ action ($50 million).272 
Under the current enforcement strategy, however, rational police depart-
ments will wait until the DOJ has publicly selected them for § 14141 investiga-
tion. The result is that the DOJ can only force a small number of departments a 
year to make changes. By adopting this enforcement strategy, the DOJ could 
induce many more police departments to make at least some proactive reforms 
aimed at curbing police violence. Doing so would expand the net of police de-
partments affected by § 14141. And by also giving these police departments an 
opportunity to justify or explain their unusually large number of police killings, 
the DOJ could also avoid unfairly stigmatizing agencies without some proce-
durally fair process. 
3. Monitoring Police Departments After § 14141 Reform 
The DOJ could also use DCRA, FBI, and BJS data on police violence to 
monitor law enforcement agencies that have already undertaken § 14141 re-
forms. Remember that § 14141 reform typically takes anywhere from five to 
ten years or longer to complete.273 Once a police department has demonstrated 
substantial compliance with the terms of the negotiated settlement, the DOJ 
will officially stop monitoring the department.274 This raises a very serious 
concern: What is to keep a police department from abandoning the reforms 
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mandated by the DOJ immediately after § 14141 oversight ends? This concern 
is especially salient because, in the absence of national statistics on police be-
havior, the DOJ has no mechanism to oversee police departments after the end 
of a consent decree. And given the high cost of police reforms, municipalities 
may be highly incentivized to drop these procedures as soon as external over-
sight ends. 
Again, these new databases do not fully solve this problem. But they do 
give the DOJ a cost-effective mechanism to keep an eye on police department 
violence after § 14141 reform ends. The DOJ could use each of these databases 
to monitor these agencies for several years thereafter. The DOJ could even 
mandate in future § 14141 settlements that a suspicious pattern of police kill-
ings after monitoring ends would trigger another investigation of the depart-
ment. Importantly, this sort of continual oversight would not be resource inten-
sive for the DOJ. And it could provide police agencies with additional incen-
tives to keep § 14141 reforms in place after the terms of the settlements con-
clude. Thus, the emergence of the DCRA, FBI, and BJS databases presents a 
unique and cost-effective opportunity for the DOJ to conduct some limited 
monitoring of police departments after § 14141 intervention ends. 
CONCLUSION 
For years, the United States has kept few statistics on local police behav-
ior. The passage of the DCRA and the announcements of new databases on po-
lice killings by the FBI and BJS do not solve this glaring problem. But these 
events represent important steps in improving oversight of police conduct. By 
making all of this new data readily available to the public, federal policymak-
ers may be able to encourage police departments to prioritize reductions in po-
lice violence. Transparency alone, though, will likely be insufficient to bring 
about widespread reductions in police violence. In order to maximize their im-
pact, the DOJ should use these new databases to improve its use of federal civil 
rights litigation against local police departments. In doing so, the DOJ can in-
crementally improve the enforcement of § 14141 and promote proactive re-
form. In order to truly realize the potential of § 14141, however, Congress must 
begin collecting more substantial statistics on police behavior. Documenting 
civilian deaths caused by law enforcement is a step in the right direction. But 
this should be just the beginning of a broader effort to document police behav-
ior and empower the DOJ’s enforcement of § 14141. 
